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2026 ANNUAL REPORT

Pact for the Future: Two Years On *civil-society-driven, independent, and forward-looking*

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1. Foreword

Time races on. It has been only two years since the [Summit of the Future](#) convened in New York in September 2024. Yet, all too often, the hard-won moment of international consensus represented by the Summit's agreement on the [Pact for the Future](#) feels distant in a world characterized by elevated crises and division.

It would be easy to dismiss the achievement as the product of another time. But this would elide the fact that the Pact demonstrated that agreement is possible despite division, and that at a time of profound transformation, there remains more that unites us than divides us. This is the hope and the promise of the Pact, grounded in a recognition of our common humanity and a commitment to our shared interest in a more sustainable future for all.

Indeed, Member States remain largely committed to the ambitions of the Pact. But as we enter the mid-point between its adoption and its official review, mandated for 2028, we must recognize that implementation has been uneven.

To make substantial progress implementing the Pact's 56 Actions and two Annexes, a multi-stakeholder approach is required, incorporating the insights, energy, and commitment of all Member States, the Secretariat, Civil Society, and the Private Sector.

In that spirit, over the past year, the [Coalition for the UN We Need](#) (C4UN) has been working with an extraordinary group of regional partners and ImPact Coalitions to convene a series of consultations across Africa, Asia, the Arab States, Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe, the Pacific Islands, and North America. This process culminated in the 2026 Global Futures Forum held in New York on July 11, 2026.

These consultations brought together more than 1,150 participants from over 100 countries, representing more than 1,000 organizations, including NGOs, youth networks, academia, Indigenous Peoples, United Nations entities, local authorities, philanthropic organizations, labour organizations, the private sector, and the media to develop actionable recommendations, and advance collective efforts to strengthen global governance and shape the road to the 2028 Review of the Pact for the Future.

As a companion piece to this process, C4UN is proud to present the following Annual Report providing a clear, independent, and civil-society-driven assessment of Pact implementation.

The primary goals of this Annual Report are to track progress; inspire accountability; serve as a strategic tool to inform and mobilize civil society; facilitate collaboration and transparency; and make a positive impact on UN reform processes for the common good.

Agreement on the Pact for the Future was an historic achievement that provides a clear roadmap for the renewal of the multilateral system in the interest of all present and future generations. The true value of that achievement will depend upon its implementation. We offer this report to facilitate the success of all who are working toward that common end.

Adam Lupel

Executive Director, Coalition for the UN We Need

2. Introduction

Two years after its adoption by Member States during the [Summit of the Future](#) (22 to 23 September 2024), the [Pact for the Future and its Annexes](#) have moved from negotiation into implementation. The Pact and its Annexes remain a framework for renewing multilateralism, advancing intergenerational equity and strengthening cooperation on shared challenges.

During 2025-2026, implementation advanced through new mechanisms, reviews, and intergovernmental processes to translate global commitments into national action. Progress nevertheless remained uneven. While some commitments moved toward delivery, others continued to face financing constraints, geopolitical divisions, and limited political follow-through. The second anniversary therefore marks a shift from establishing structures to assessing tangible results.

Momentum around implementation has also been sustained through continued political engagement and dialogue. Germany and Namibia, as former co-facilitators of the Pact, have continued to play a convening role alongside the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG) and the President of the General Assembly (PGA). During the 80th session, Germany and Namibia, together with EOSG, convened discussions on [system-wide progress and the way forward](#) in February 2026 and on [advancing implementation at the national level](#) in May 2026. The PGA similarly maintained implementation on the General Assembly's political agenda, including through an April 2026 [interactive dialogue](#) linking delivery of the Pact with the UN80 Initiative and a July 2026 [stocktaking meeting](#). That stocktake was preceded by a dedicated [civil society and stakeholder dialogue](#) involving the PGA and Deputy Secretary-General, helping bring perspectives beyond Member States into the assessment of progress. These engagements have helped keep attention on implementation, connect UN system and national-level efforts, and maintain a pathway toward the Pact's comprehensive review in 2028.

Recognizing that the Pact's credibility depends on meaningful engagement beyond Member States, this second annual report again places civil society at the centre of implementation and monitoring, as a source of evidence, innovation, and accountability, and as partners in sustaining momentum toward the comprehensive review in 2027 for the Global Digital Compact and in 2028 for the Pact for the Future and the Declaration on Future Generations.

This second annual follow-up report provides a civil-society-driven, independent, and forward-looking stocktake of the Pact for the Future's implementation. Building on the first-year assessment, it examines where actions have advanced, where implementation remains underway, and where progress has been limited or delayed. Its purpose is to strengthen public understanding and accountability as implementation moves toward the comprehensive review in 2028.

The report covers the period 17 September 2025 to 16 September 2026. It is intended as a focused stocktake, aligned with the Coalition for the UN We Need's priorities and engagements, rather than a comprehensive record of all Pact-related activity.

3. Chapter 1: Sustainable development and financing for development

Action	Progress
Action 4. We will close the Sustainable Development Goal financing gap in developing countries.	The SDG Stimulus has continued to shape the development-finance agenda, but it has not been established as a separately capitalized mechanism. Its core proposals of greater multilateral development bank lending, expanded liquidity, debt relief, and longer-term affordable finance, have instead been absorbed into follow-up to the Sevilla Commitment and broader discussions on reforming the international financial architecture. This has preserved the substance of the proposal within intergovernmental deliberations, but has also dispersed accountability for its delivery. Meanwhile, the contraction in official development assistance during 2025 and historically high debt-service burdens have further constrained the fiscal space available to developing countries. The negotiations on a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation have provided the clearest intergovernmental movement under this action. Substantive sessions in 2026 advanced work on the framework convention and its early protocols, including taxation of cross-border services and tax dispute prevention and resolution. The process represents a significant shift towards more universal participation in international tax rule-making. However, major divisions remain over the allocation of taxing rights, decision-making, dispute resolution, and the relationship with existing arrangements. No convention or resulting revenue gains have yet been delivered. Implementation of the Sevilla Commitment also moved from adoption to early follow-up. The Sevilla Platform for Action began reporting on voluntary initiatives, and the launch of a platform for borrower countries provided a new channel for coordination among States confronting high borrowing costs and debt distress. These developments have strengthened the architecture around implementation, but have not yet changed the aggregate financing picture. The focus now is ensuring that the process generates additional concessional finance, faster and more predictable debt treatment and changes in the governance and lending practices of international financial institutions.
Action 5. We will ensure that the multilateral trading system continues to be an engine for sustainable development.	The Fourteenth WTO Ministerial Conference in March 2026 returned institutional reform, development and dispute settlement to the centre of ministerial discussions. Members considered questions concerning decision-making, special and differential treatment, the organization's negotiating function and restoration of a fully functioning dispute-settlement system. The Conference maintained a pathway for reform and referred further work to Geneva, but it did not produce agreement on a comprehensive reform package. The outcome therefore preserved the institution and its reform agenda without resolving the fundamental political disagreements that have weakened it. In particular, the continued impairment of the dispute-settlement system and differences over development flexibilities, consensus-based decision-making and the treatment of industrial policies remain significant obstacles. These challenges have been compounded by a wider shift in the global trading environment, including the growing use of tariffs and trade restrictions as instruments of geopolitical and economic competition, particularly between the

	United States and China, and renewed trade tensions between the United States and several of its traditional partners. These developments have further fractured the longstanding consensus, particularly among advanced economies, around the value of open and rules-based trade and made universal progress on WTO reform more difficult. Against this backdrop, the continued impairment of the dispute-settlement system and differences over development flexibilities, consensus-based decision-making and the treatment of industrial policies remain significant obstacles to strengthening the multilateral trading system.
<i>Action 6. We will invest in people to end poverty and strengthen trust and social cohesion.</i>	The immediate commitment was completed when the Second World Summit for Social Development convened in Doha in November 2025 and adopted the Doha Political Declaration. The Declaration renewed commitments to poverty eradication, full and productive employment and decent work, social integration, universal social protection and access to essential services. It also updated the social-development agenda to address digital transformation, demographic change, climate impacts and contemporary financing constraints. Since the Summit, follow-up has moved into the Commission for Social Development and national implementation. This represents a transition from negotiation to institutional follow-up, but the Declaration contains few quantified targets, deadlines or new financing commitments. Its practical significance will therefore depend on whether Member States incorporate its commitments into national legislation, social-protection systems and public budgets. At this stage, the political outcome has been delivered, but evidence of implementation at scale remains limited.
<i>Action 9. We will strengthen our actions to address climate change.</i>	Early Warnings for All remains one of the clearest areas of measurable Pact implementation. By late 2025, 119 countries reported having a multi-hazard early-warning system, and expansion continued during 2026. The quality and comprehensiveness of systems have also improved in several regions, supported by stronger coordination among the World Meteorological Organization, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, the International Telecommunication Union and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Progress remains uneven, however. Small island developing States and many African countries continue to face major gaps in observation infrastructure, forecasting capacity, communication networks and locally accessible warning systems. Some existing systems also do not adequately cover emerging or intensifying hazards, including extreme heat and wildfires. With the universal-coverage deadline approaching in 2027, implementation must be assessed not only by the existence of a national system, but by whether warnings reliably reach people at risk and lead to early action.
<i>Action 10. We will accelerate our efforts to restore, protect, conserve and sustainably use the environment.</i>	Movement since the inconclusive INC-5.2 negotiations on plastics pollution in August 2025 has been predominantly procedural. INC-5.3 met in February 2026 to elect new officers, but no substantive treaty negotiations took place. The new Chair subsequently convened informal meetings of Heads of Delegation and circulated an informal aid to negotiations intended to rebuild trust and identify potential areas of convergence. These consultations have kept the process alive but have not resolved the central disagreements over controls on plastic production, chemicals of concern, financing,

	national implementation and the legal nature of obligations. No agreed negotiating text or confirmed timetable for concluding the treaty had emerged at the time of compiling this report. The Pact's original end-of-2024 ambition has therefore been missed, though the intergovernmental deliberations continue, demonstrating that multilateral action remains in motion.
<i>Action 12. We will plan for the future and strengthen our collective efforts to turbocharge the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by 2030 and beyond.</i>	The HLPF continued to perform its established review, convening and voluntary national review functions in 2026. The parallel review of ECOSOC and the HLPF created an opportunity to consider working methods and institutional coherence, but no fundamental shift away from the Forum's voluntary, State-led model was evident. The Forum remains useful for sustaining political attention, presenting national experiences and identifying implementation gaps, but has limited capacity to compel follow-up or connect its conclusions directly with financing decisions. Discussion of a sustainable development framework beyond 2030 remains at a very early and politically sensitive stage. Member States are not yet close to negotiating a successor to the 2030 Agenda, and there is not yet agreement even on when or how such a conversation should formally begin. For some, opening a post-2030 discussion too early risks diverting political attention and resources from commitments that remain substantially unfulfilled. Others see an increasingly urgent need to begin considering the longer-term international framework. The September 2027 HLPF under General Assembly auspices will therefore be an important political juncture, but should not be treated as the endpoint of a process that has already begun. Its immediate priority is likely to remain accelerating delivery of the existing Agenda, while potentially creating space for an inclusive and carefully sequenced conversation about what comes after 2030.

4. Chapter 2: International Peace and Security

Action	Progress
<i>Action 13. We will redouble our efforts to build and sustain peaceful, inclusive and just societies and address the root causes of conflicts.</i>	The Secretary-General delivered the requested report on the impact of military expenditure on sustainable development at the end of the seventy-ninth session, completing the specific reporting mandate. The analysis linked record levels of global military expenditure with foregone investment in poverty reduction, climate action, health, education and conflict prevention. It also reinforced the Pact's normative language that security and sustainable development cannot be treated as separate expenditure choices, particularly where rising debt and fiscal constraints are already narrowing national policy space. The report has strengthened the evidence base but has not generated an intergovernmental agreement on expenditure restraint, transparency or reallocation. Military spending has continued to rise amid worsening geopolitical tensions, while development and humanitarian budgets have contracted. The central implementation gap is therefore political rather than analytical: Member States requested evidence on the trade-offs, but have not agreed on collective measures to address them.

<i>Action 14. We will protect all civilians in armed conflict.</i>	The children and armed conflict agenda remained active through the Secretary-General's annual report, Security Council debates, the monitoring and reporting mechanisms and the work of the Council's Working Group. Debates during the reporting period maintained political attention on recruitment and use, killing and maiming, sexual violence, abduction, attacks on schools and hospitals, denial of humanitarian access and detention of children. Engagement with Member States also continued to produce action plans and, in some contexts, releases of children and improvements in national protection frameworks. These institutional activities did not translate into an overall reduction in grave violations. The scale and intensity of conflict, restrictions on humanitarian access and persistent non-compliance by both State and non-State actors continued to expose children to severe harm. Divisions within the Security Council have also affected the consistency of accountability and enforcement. Implementation has therefore continued through established mechanisms, but the widening gap between monitoring and protection remains a central concern.
<i>Action 19. We will accelerate the implementation of our commitments on women, peace and security.</i>	The twenty-fifth anniversary of Security Council resolution 1325 in October 2025 generated renewed political attention, including Security Council debates and commitments concerning women's participation, protection and leadership. Further debates in 2026, including under Colombia's Council presidency, continued to foreground the exclusion of women from formal peace processes, violence against women peacebuilders and the chronic underfunding of women-led peacebuilding organizations. For example, five years after the Taliban takeover, the unparalleled exclusion of women and girls from public life, including a ban on girls' post-primary education, continues in Afghanistan. The anniversary did not, however, produce a new binding implementation mechanism or a major financing settlement. Women remained underrepresented in many formal negotiations and mediation processes, while conflict-related sexual violence and reprisals against women human rights defenders continued. Therefore, since September 2025, there has been sustained normative support but limited structural change. Implementation should be measured by participation in actual delegations and agreements, access to financing and protection from reprisals, not by the number of anniversary events or Council statements.
<i>Action 20. We will accelerate the implementation of our commitments on youth, peace and security.</i>	Work on the second independent progress study advanced during the reporting period through consultations with young peacebuilders, Member States, United Nations entities and regional organizations. The process has provided an opportunity to assess changes since the first global study and to examine persistent barriers relating to participation, protection, financing, civic space and recognition of youth-led peacebuilding. The study will be formally presented to the General Assembly at the beginning of its 81st Session. Its value will depend on whether it produces an independent evidence base and actionable recommendations, rather than simply restating existing youth, peace and security commitments. A clear intergovernmental follow-up process may also be useful to prevent the study from becoming an isolated reporting exercise.

<i>Action 21. We will adapt peace operations to better respond to existing challenges and new realities.</i>	The Secretary-General issued the requested review on the future of all forms of UN peace operations in August 2026, completing one of Chapter 2's most concrete institutional mandates. The review argues for a more flexible peace operations toolbox, including stronger political strategies, more tailored and modular deployments, better transition planning, deeper partnerships with regional organizations and more systematic use of technology, data and foresight. Its publication moved the commitment from consultation to a defined set of proposals for Member State consideration. Implementation will depend on decisions by the Security Council, General Assembly and budgetary bodies. The review is also unfolding alongside UN80 and severe financial constraints, creating a risk that "adaptation" becomes synonymous with retrenchment. A credible follow-up should distinguish reforms that improve political effectiveness from reductions driven principally by liquidity and budget pressure. Progress under resolution 2719 has been slower. The United Nations and African Union continued work on planning, compliance, accountability and cost-sharing arrangements, but assessed-contribution financing had not yet become a predictable mechanism. Political disagreement over individual operations and financial responsibility has limited application of the framework.
<i>Action 24. We will prevent and combat transnational organized crime and related illicit financial flows.</i>	The United Nations Convention against Cybercrime moved from adoption to the signature and ratification phase during the reporting period. It opened for signature in Hanoi in October 2025, giving States a common framework for cooperation on cybercrime, electronic evidence, capacity-building and technical assistance. The opening ceremony represented the completion of the negotiating phase and the beginning of national processes required for entry into force. The Convention had not yet entered into force at the time of writing this report, as the required threshold of ratifications had not been reached. Concerns also remain regarding the breadth of some offences, safeguards for human rights and journalists, data-sharing and the risk of misuse against legitimate online activity. Implementation hinges on the strength of domestic safeguards and the quality of capacity-building support available to those countries that need it.
<i>Action 25. We will advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.</i>	The 2026 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons concluded without an agreed substantive outcome. As in the previous review cycle, divisions over nuclear disarmament, security assurances, regional proliferation concerns and the implementation of past commitments prevented consensus. The failure was particularly significant for the Pact because Action 25 commits Member States not only to preserve the existing architecture, but to accelerate implementation and prevent its erosion. Other disarmament forums continued to meet, and support for nuclear-weapon-free zones and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons remained active. Nevertheless, nuclear modernization, deteriorating relations among nuclear-armed States and the absence of agreed risk-reduction measures point in the opposite direction from the Pact's stated objective. The reporting period therefore produced continued diplomatic activity but no substantive advance towards elimination.

<i>Action 26. We will uphold our disarmament obligations and commitments.</i>	Discussion of a possible fourth special session devoted to disarmament continued in the General Assembly and its disarmament machinery, but Member States have not agreed on a date, agenda or preparatory framework by the end of the reporting period. The Pact has therefore kept SSOD-IV politically visible without resolving longstanding differences over its scope, decision-making and relationship with existing bodies. Under the Biological Weapons Convention, the Working Group on strengthening the Convention continued substantive consideration of compliance, verification, international cooperation, science and technology and institutional support. These discussions have narrowed some technical questions and preserved engagement on possible legally binding measures. They have not, however, produced agreement on a verification mechanism or new legal instrument. The political divide between Member States favouring a stronger compliance architecture and those preferring voluntary or incremental measures remains unresolved.
<i>Action 27. We will seize the opportunities associated with new and emerging technologies and address the potential risks posed by their misuse.</i>	The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on lethal autonomous weapons systems reached an important milestone at its final 2026 session in Geneva, held from 31 August to 4 September. After more than a decade of discussions under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), States reached consensus on a substantive, non-binding outcome setting out elements of a possible instrument governing autonomous weapons systems. The text develops a framework around prohibitions and regulatory measures, including the application of international humanitarian law, human judgement and control, accountability, legal reviews and measures to mitigate risks. The agreement represents a significant narrowing of differences and provides a potential basis for the next stage of negotiations, although States remain divided over whether the eventual framework should take the form of a legally binding instrument. The outcome will now feed into the CCW Review Conference in November 2026, where States will have an opportunity to consider whether to move towards formal negotiations. The consensus nevertheless required compromises. Some provisions, including language concerning the definition of autonomous weapons systems, human judgement and safeguards against civilian harm, were weakened during the final negotiations, reflecting continuing differences among States over the scope and legal character of future rules. The agreement therefore marks a meaningful procedural and normative advance, rather than the conclusion of the governance debate: the central political question is increasingly shifting from whether common international parameters can be articulated to whether States are prepared to translate them into binding rules. The Secretary-General has also continued reporting on developments in artificial intelligence, autonomy, biotechnology, quantum technologies and other emerging technologies with potential military applications. Such reporting can strengthen shared understanding and enable delegations with more limited technical capacity to participate in increasingly complex debates. But developments in the GGE underscore the larger challenge: technological development and military deployment continue to move rapidly, while multilateral governance remains incremental. The Geneva agreement is therefore an important step, but its longer-term significance will depend on whether States use it as a bridge towards an effective international regulatory framework.

5. Chapter 3: Science, Technology and Innovation and Digital Cooperation

Action	Progress
<i>Action 33. We will support the Secretary-General to strengthen the role of the United Nations in supporting international cooperation in science, technology and innovation.</i>	The Secretary-General's Scientific Advisory Board continues to provide advice to the Secretary-General and to connect scientific expertise with United Nations policy processes. Its work has supported a broader institutional emphasis on foresight, evidence-based policymaking and the responsible governance of emerging technologies. The Board has also provided an intellectual foundation for more specialized mechanisms, including the new scientific arrangements on artificial intelligence. The Board remains advisory, however, and there is limited evidence that its recommendations have systematically changed intergovernmental decisions, country-team capabilities or programme financing at this point in time. The next phase should therefore focus on transparent reporting of how scientific advice is used across the United Nations system and on practical support for Resident Coordinators and country teams, particularly in developing countries.
<i>Annex I: Global Digital Compact</i>	<u><i>Global Dialogue on AI Governance</i></u> This was one of the clearest areas of institutional implementation during 2025 and 2026. Following the General Assembly's agreement on the terms of reference and modalities, members of the Independent International Scientific Panel on AI were appointed in 2026. The Panel subsequently began its work and issued a preliminary report intended to establish a common evidence base on AI's opportunities, risks and implications for sustainable development. The first Global Dialogue on AI Governance convened in Geneva in July 2026, bringing together governments, international organizations, companies, researchers, technical experts and civil society. The Dialogue created a recurring United Nations venue for discussing governance fragmentation, capacity gaps, safety, human rights and the distribution of AI's benefits. Its first session was deliberative rather than decision-making, however. The principal test will be whether the Panel's assessments and the Dialogue's discussions inform national regulation, international standards, capacity-building and future General Assembly decisions. <u><i>Financing</i></u> The Secretary-General developed and presented options for voluntary financing, including the use of pooled funds, partnerships with international financial institutions, philanthropic contributions, private-sector support and in-kind access to computing infrastructure, data and technical expertise. This completed the requested analytical step and helped define the types of resources required to narrow AI capacity gaps. Existing support remains fragmented across agencies, bilateral programmes, development banks and corporate initiatives, making it difficult for developing countries to access predictable, country-owned assistance. Reliance on voluntary and private financing also raises questions about sustainability, donor priorities and corporate influence. At the AI Impact Summit in February 2026 and again at the Global Dialogue on AI in July 2026, the Secretary-General proposed a \$3 billion Global Fund for AI.

Global Digital Compact Endorsements

The public endorsement mechanism for the [Global Digital Compact](#) remained operational and the registry [expanded](#) during the reporting period to include organizations from civil society, academia, the private sector, the technical community and international and regional institutions. The mechanism has helped broaden political ownership of the Compact and provides an entry point for actors whose participation is essential to implementing commitments on connectivity, digital public infrastructure, data, online safety and AI.

Endorsement remains voluntary and does not require signatories to report against common indicators or disclose the resources committed. It is therefore better understood as a coalition-building mechanism than an accountability framework. The next stage should connect endorsement with specific, transparent commitments and periodic reporting, while ensuring that participation by companies does not substitute for public regulation or independent oversight.

WSIS+20 Review

The General Assembly completed the [WSIS+20](#) high-level review in December 2025. The outcome reaffirmed the continuing relevance of the Geneva and Tunis outcomes, renewed the role of the [Internet Governance Forum](#) and incorporated the Global Digital Compact more clearly into the wider digital-cooperation architecture. This helped avoid the creation of two disconnected implementation tracks and confirmed that established WSIS institutions should contribute to delivery of the Compact. A draft [Joint Implementation Road Map](#) designed to strengthen coherence and coordination between the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) framework and the Global Digital Compact (GDC) within the United Nations system has also been published.

The review also exposed continuing political differences over Internet governance, digital sovereignty, human rights, financing, data governance and the relative roles of governments and non-governmental stakeholders. Its principal achievement was institutional continuity and alignment rather than a new financing or accountability settlement. Implementation now depends on whether the [Commission on Science and Technology for Development](#), the Internet Governance Forum, [WSIS action-line facilitators](#) and United Nations country teams translate the outcome into coordinated national and regional support.

Implementation and Review of the Global Digital Compact

The Compact's institutional architecture became more established during 2025 and 2026. The implementation map provided an initial overview of activities across the United Nations system and other stakeholders, while the [Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies](#) assumed a central coordination role. The Commission on Science and Technology for Development also advanced work on data governance, and United Nations entities increasingly referenced the Compact in digital-development and capacity-building programmes.

This constitutes genuine movement from adoption to institutionalization, but the implementation landscape remains fragmented. The map is not yet a comprehensive results framework, reporting is uneven and many commitments lack identifiable financing. National delivery also depends on capacities and policy choices that cannot be generated by United Nations coordination alone. Preparations for the

	2027 high-level review should therefore establish clearer indicators, transparent stakeholder participation and evidence of implementation at country level.
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6. Chapter 4: Youth and Future Generations and the Declaration on Future Generations

Action	Progress
<i>Action 34. We will invest in the social and economic development of children and young people so that they can reach their full potential.</i>	Work on the proposed Global Youth Investment Platform continued through the inter-agency task force coordinated by the United Nations Youth Office. Consultations considered how a platform could attract public, private and philanthropic finance, align youth programming with national priorities and strengthen country-level coordination. Member State briefings provided updates and enabled delegations to comment on the emerging proposal. At the time of writing this report, the Platform had not been launched as an operational financing mechanism. Questions remained regarding its institutional home, governance, relationship with existing funds, country ownership and sources of capital. The process has therefore moved beyond an initial concept but has not yet produced additional financing for youth programming. The clearest implementation test will be whether the proposal results in a resourced mechanism with accessible funding windows and meaningful youth participation in governance.
<i>Action 37. We will strengthen meaningful youth participation at the international level.</i>	DESA continued to coordinate and support the UN Youth Delegate Programme, including through guidance to Member States, orientation for delegates and links with the ECOSOC Youth Forum and General Assembly processes. Additional Member States have maintained or introduced national arrangements, and youth delegates have become more visible across several intergovernmental processes. Participation remains uneven and largely dependent on voluntary national practice. Many delegations still do not include youth representatives, and selection, financing and substantive influence vary widely. Delegates from developing countries and marginalized communities face particular barriers relating to travel costs, visas, language and access to negotiations. The growth of the programme is therefore positive, but the Pact's emphasis on meaningful and geographically balanced participation has not yet been realized consistently.
<i>Action 37. We will strengthen meaningful youth participation at the international level.</i>	The United Nations Youth Office and other entities continued awareness-raising and resource-mobilization efforts for youth participation. The UN Youth Fund remains one of the few mechanisms specifically identified in the Pact to reduce the financial barriers faced by youth representatives from developing countries. The establishment of a substantial replenishment or a major expansion in supported participation remains limited. As a result, geographical and socioeconomic inequalities continue to shape who is able to attend United Nations meetings. Awareness-raising alone is insufficient unless it produces predictable contributions, transparent allocation criteria and public reporting on beneficiaries and results.

Action 37. We will strengthen meaningful youth participation at the international level.	The launch of the Core Principles for Meaningful Youth Participation in March 2026 was a concrete achievement under Chapter 4. Developed through consultations with young people, Member States and UN entities, the principles provide a common reference for participation that is meaningful, representative, inclusive, safe, transparent and adequately supported. They help move the debate beyond the number of young people present towards the quality and influence of their engagement. The principles are not self-executing. Their impact will depend on whether intergovernmental bodies, United Nations entities and Member States incorporate them into participation rules, accreditation, funding, safeguarding and feedback arrangements. No mandatory system-wide accountability mechanism accompanied their launch. The next step should be a transparent implementation framework that allows young people to assess whether United Nations processes meet the standards established.
Annex II: Declaration on Future Generations	The launch of the Group of Friends on Future Generations, co-chaired by Jamaica and the Netherlands, created a new Member State platform for sustaining political attention to the Declaration on Future Generations. Through strategic discussions, briefings and retreats, the cross-regional Group has begun to examine how future-generations considerations can be incorporated into national policymaking, United Nations processes, strategic foresight and preparations for the 2028 high-level review. This is an important step towards building a constituency for implementation across different policy areas. A further indication of the Declaration's normative weight is the incorporation of its intergenerational framing into other intergovernmental outcomes. General Assembly resolution 80/251 on mandate creation, implementation and review, adopted under the UN80 Initiative, states that United Nations mandates should deliver maximum impact while taking into account the needs and interests of future generations, carrying this principle into how mandates across the system are created, implemented and reviewed. However, institutional implementation remains incomplete. A Special Envoy for Future Generations has not been appointed, and questions concerning mandate, resources, institutional anchoring and the relationship with UN80 remained unresolved. Progress has therefore occurred through coalition-building and agenda development rather than through a dedicated implementation office or accountability mechanism. The Group of Friends intends to help close this gap, but it will need to connect political discussion with practical tools, national reporting and system-wide changes in decision-making.

7. Chapter 5: Transforming Global Governance

Action	Progress
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Actions 39 – 41. Reform of the Security Council.	The Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council (reform of the Security Council) continued throughout the eightieth session, with structured dialogues on membership categories, regional representation, the veto, Council size and working methods, and the relationship between the Council and General Assembly. Delegations further elaborated existing models and continued to identify areas of convergence, including broad support for correcting Africa’s underrepresentation and increasing the presence of developing countries. The process did not move to text-based negotiations or produce a consolidated reform model. Fundamental differences persisted over permanent membership, veto rights, the length and renewability of new seats and the size of an enlarged Council. The outcome of the 2025-2026 session remained largely procedural, including the preservation of the IGN, its institutional memory and the inputs produced during the year. The veto initiative continued to provide an automatic General Assembly accountability mechanism following the use of a veto in the Security Council. These meetings have widened participation and required vetoing permanent members to explain their positions before the wider membership. Communication between the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission also continued, including through written advice and briefings. These are useful procedural gains, although neither mechanism changes the legal effect of a veto or guarantees that Council members act on advice received. The Council’s open debate on working methods under Denmark’s presidency in August 2026 again highlighted concentration of penholdership, unequal access to subsidiary bodies, transparency of sanctions work and the need for greater participation by elected members and the wider membership. Council members expressed support for greater inclusivity, but no formal redistribution of penholdership or new access regime was agreed. Working-method improvements therefore remain dependent on voluntary practice rather than enforceable rules.
Action 42. We will increase our efforts to revitalize the work of the General Assembly.	The selection process of the next UN Secretary-General was formally initiated through the joint letter issued by the Presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council in November 2025. Building on General Assembly resolution 79/327 and reforms introduced since 2015, nominated candidates submitted vision statements and participated in interactive dialogues with the General Assembly. Additional public and civil society dialogues in locations including Geneva, London, Jeju and Montevideo helped broaden scrutiny beyond New York and increased public discussion of candidates’ priorities. The process is more transparent than pre-2016 selections, but its underlying distribution of authority remains unchanged. The Security Council will likely continue to recommend a single candidate for selection by the General Assembly, permanent members retain the ability to block candidacies, and there is no formal requirement to appoint a woman.

Action 43. We will strengthen the Economic and Social Council to accelerate sustainable development.	Cooperation between ECOSOC, the Peacebuilding Commission and international financial institutions continued through joint meetings, briefings and the Financing for Development Forum. These interactions have helped connect development finance, prevention and peacebuilding, but remain largely consultative. Neither ECOSOC nor the Commission gained authority to require follow-up by the international financial institutions. Civil society engagement remained constrained by the operation of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations. The Committee continued to process applications in 2026, but repeated deferrals, extensive questioning and concerns about politicization remained barriers for some organizations, including human rights groups. The Commission on the Status of Women revitalization process showed more identifiable movement. The first multi-stakeholder dialogue in January 2026 created a new channel for civil society and other stakeholders to contribute on the Commission's working methods. This was a direct procedural outcome of the revitalization mandate, but the effectiveness of the revitalization will depend on whether participation becomes more meaningful and whether Member States can negotiate outcomes that generate stronger implementation and accountability.
Action 44. We will strengthen the Peacebuilding Commission.	The 2025 review of the peacebuilding architecture concluded and produced agreed General Assembly and Security Council outcomes. The review reaffirmed national ownership, prevention, the Commission's advisory and bridging roles, stronger partnerships with regional organizations and international financial institutions, and the importance of financing and civil society participation. Completion of the review fulfilled the principal process commitment attached to Action 44. The outcome was evolutionary rather than transformative. It did not provide the Commission with new decision-making authority or a major increase in resources, and implementation depends on requests from concerned States and cooperation from the Security Council, ECOSOC and financial institutions. Early follow-up has emphasized improved working methods and partnerships, but the next test is whether the Commission becomes more influential during mission transitions and whether its advice affects political and financing decisions.
Action 45. We will strengthen the United Nations system.	The UN80 Initiative has been the principal vehicle for institutional reform since March 2025. Its three workstreams addressed efficiencies, mandate implementation and structural realignment. The General Assembly's March 2026 decision on mandate review created a formal Member State process, while the Secretariat advanced proposals on administrative platforms, digital tools, programme coherence and structural reform. The Ad Hoc Working Group continues its work until March 2027. These reforms were accompanied by binding resource decisions. On 30 December 2025, the General Assembly adopted a USD 3.45 billion regular budget for 2026, approximately 7 per cent below the approved 2025 budget and incorporating substantial reductions in posts and expenditure. A significant financial reform followed on 30 June 2026, when the General Assembly adopted resolution 80/270 on the credit-return methodology. Under the previous rule, the United Nations could be required to return or offset unspent balances even when the underspending resulted from assessed contributions that had never been received, reinforcing a

	cycle in which cash shortages forced spending restrictions, which then generated further credits against future assessments. It does not, however, create new income or resolve the underlying problem of unpaid and late assessments. Payment discipline therefore remains central to the implementation of both UN80 and the Pact. As of 15 September 2026, 139 Member States have paid their regular budget assessments in full. Under the UN80 Initiative's Workstream 3 on structural realignment, several proposals moved into more detailed assessment in 2026. These included consolidating training and research functions through a proposed UN System Staff College and UNITAR merger, alongside possible mergers between UN Women and UNFPA, and UNDP and UNOPS, and the planned transition of UNAIDS functions into relevant UN development system entities. Most remain subject to further analysis and Member State or governing-body decisions, with delegations stressing the need to protect mandates and assess costs, staffing and country-level impact. Additionally, an August 2026 development-system report also advanced proposals to strengthen the financing of the Resident Coordinator system, streamline country teams and provide more integrated access to UN expertise at country level. This represents substantial institutional activity, but it is unfolding amid a severe financial crisis and significant reductions in posts and expenditure. The principal political risk is that liquidity-driven retrenchment is presented as organizational reform. Action 45 calls for greater capability and more predictable financing, not simply a smaller organization. UN80's success should therefore be judged by whether it protects field delivery, strengthens the Resident Coordinator system and reinvests efficiencies in priority capabilities, rather than by savings alone.
<i>Action 46. We will ensure the effective enjoyment by all of all human rights and respond to new and emerging challenges.</i>	The Secretary-General's assessment confirmed the longstanding mismatch between the mandates assigned to United Nations human rights mechanisms and the resources available for implementation. It highlighted OHCHR's dependence on voluntary contributions, the growing workload of treaty bodies, special procedures and investigative mechanisms, and the operational consequences of delayed or insufficient funding. Since September 2025 that has not been a corresponding increase in adequate and predictable financing but rather a decrease. The United Nations liquidity crisis and wider budget reductions instead placed additional pressure on staffing, field presences, investigations and support to treaty bodies. The assessment fulfilled the reporting request from Member States, but its findings have not been translated into a financing settlement. This is a particularly clear example of the distinction between procedural implementation and substantive delivery. Discussions are currently underway on the proposed programme budget for 2027. The proposed budget for 2027, which is likely to be published towards the end of September 2026, is expected to reflect an incremental approach towards fully implementing action 46 and ensuring that all mandated human rights activities are covered in their entirety by the regular UN budget.

<i>Action 48. We will accelerate reform of the international financial architecture to strengthen the voice and representation of developing countries.</i>	The June 2025 deadline for identifying approaches to quota realignment was missed, and work under the IMF's Seventeenth General Review continued during 2025 and 2026 without agreement on a new quota formula. The additional Executive Board chair for sub-Saharan Africa improved representation at the Board, but did not materially redistribute voting power. The political obstacle remains disagreement among major shareholders over whether and how quotas should reflect changes in the global economy without reducing the shares of the poorest members. As a result, the IMF remains dependent on interim arrangements and periodic resource increases that do not address the underlying distribution of voice. The Pact's specific timetable has therefore slipped, and a central governance reform challenge remains unresolved.
<i>Action 50. We will accelerate the reform of the international financial architecture so that countries can borrow sustainably to invest in their long-term development.</i>	Engagement between the United Nations, Member States and credit-rating agencies continued during 2026, including dialogue on methodologies, transparency, data gaps, procyclicality and the treatment of climate vulnerability and long-term public investment. These discussions have helped elevate concerns long raised by developing countries about the effects of ratings on borrowing costs and access to capital. The engagement remains voluntary and has not produced a binding code, independent oversight mechanism or agreed methodology changes. Rating agencies retain substantial discretion, while concerns persist that downgrades can amplify shocks and discourage investment needed for sustainable development. The dialogue is therefore politically relevant, but its practical effect will depend on transparent methodological reforms and stronger accountability.
<i>Action 53. We will develop a framework on measures of progress on sustainable development to complement and go beyond gross domestic product.</i>	The independent high-level expert group was established and has developed recommendations for a limited dashboard intended to complement GDP with measures of well-being, inclusion, sustainability and resilience. Its work shifted the debate from general support for "beyond GDP" towards a more concrete set of indicators and principles. On 7th May 2026, the High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP presented their report to Member States. The subsequent intergovernmental process also began during the eightieth session. The President of the General Assembly appointed co-facilitators (Spain and Guyana), consultations were held and a draft text was circulated for Member State consideration. Political questions remain over the choice and weighting of indicators, national ownership, data capacity and whether the framework should inform access to development finance. Nevertheless, both the expert group and intergovernmental process requested by the Pact have moved forward within the anticipated sequence.

<i>Action 55. We will strengthen our partnerships to deliver on existing commitments and address new and emerging challenges.</i>	United Nations engagement with national parliaments continued through the annual General Assembly and Inter-Parliamentary Union hearing and related meetings in 2026. These exchanges provided parliamentarians with opportunities to discuss implementation of United Nations agreements, financing and public accountability. They remain principally consultative, however, and parliamentary participation is not systematically integrated into most intergovernmental processes. The Secretary-General also provided recommendations on engagement with local and regional authorities, emphasizing their role in localizing the SDGs, delivering public services and connecting global commitments with communities. The recommendations completed the requested reporting mandate, but Member States have not created a formal standing mechanism for such engagement. The two commitments have therefore generated dialogue and policy recommendations, but limited institutional change.
<i>Action 56. We will strengthen international cooperation for the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity.</i>	The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its Legal and Scientific and Technical Subcommittees continued work during 2026 on the long-term sustainability of outer-space activities, space debris mitigation, space resources and coordination of increasingly congested orbits. Working groups and expert exchanges have helped clarify technical and legal issues and maintained a universal intergovernmental forum at a time of rapidly expanding governmental and commercial activity. No binding international framework on space traffic management, debris or resource activity had been agreed. Differences remain over the interpretation of existing treaties, commercial extraction, equitable access, technology transfer and whether new rules should be legally binding. The publication of a conference note in June 2026 signposts work towards a possible UNISPACE IV conference as a future political milestone, but the regulatory gap continues to widen as activity accelerates.



The Coalition for the UN We Need (C4UN) is a global platform of civil society organizations committed to creating a stronger, more effective, and more accountable United Nations system. Established in 2017, C4UN brings together individuals and organizations from all regions of the world to strengthen civil society engagement in UN reform and global governance renewal.

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