

## ICH Special Bulletin on Chapter 2 on International Peace and Security

**ABOUT:** The intergovernmental consultations and negotiations on the Pact for the Future officially started in February 2023 and ended in September 2024 just days before the Summit of the Future scheduled for 22 to 23 September. The co-facilitators of the Summit of the Future (SOTF), Germany and Namibia, published the [zero-draft](#) on 26 January 2024. Following further closed negotiations and consultations the [Rev. 1](#), [Rev. 2](#), [Rev. 3](#), [Rev. 4](#) and Rev. 5 were released by the co-facilitators throughout 2024. The Rev. 5 was circulated by the President of the General Assembly (PGA) on 20 September as an [advance unedited version](#) (hereafter referred to as the Pact or in some instances as Rev. 5). This ICH Special Bulletin captures the key elements in Ch. 2 of the Pact and dives into how the negotiations evolved through 2024 building on ICH Bulletins [#27](#), [#37](#), [#45](#), [#58](#), and [#63](#).

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

The Pact requests the Secretary-General (SG) to undertake a review on the future of all forms of **UNs' peace operations** to provide strategic and action-oriented recommendations for the consideration of Member States (MS). It calls on the Security Council to ensure peace operations are anchored in political strategies, deployed with clear mandates, and make transition plans at the earliest stage possible. Pursuing stronger alignment between the UN, international and regional financial institutions and the needs of MS affected by conflict and violence is also proposed.

**Partnerships with regional and sub-regional organizations** like the African Union (AU) in the context of peace enforcement actions, counter-terrorism and mediation, among others, have been emphasized throughout Ch. 2. Action 21g seeks to ensure that AU-led peace support operations are supported with adequate, predictable and sustainable financing in line with Security Council resolution 2719(2023). The Rev. 1 language encouraging the SG to convene an annual high-level meeting with relevant regional organizations to discuss peace operations, peacebuilding, and conflicts was dropped in Rev. 2 but was again brought back in Rev. 3 and maintained since.

The Pact in Action 14 decides to take concrete steps to **protect civilians in armed conflict**; ensure humanitarian access; and protect journalists, humanitarian and UN personnel. The language on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas has changed from “avoid at all costs” in Rev. 1, to “refrain” in Rev. 2, to “restrict or refrain, as appropriate” in Rev. 3 and after. The Rev. 2 and later versions have added a qualification of “when their use may be expected to cause harm to civilians or civilian objects” for NOT using explosive weapons in populated areas (which, on the flipside, could also imply that explosive weapons can be used in populated areas when they are NOT “EXPECTED” to cause harm to civilians or civilian objects).

Action 15 proposes to address the root causes of forced and protracted displacement; eliminate hunger, acute food insecurity, famine and famine-like conditions; and increase financial support, including through anticipatory financing mechanisms, to support countries facing **humanitarian crisis**. Action 19 seeks to tackle barriers and accelerate implementation of the Women, Peace and Security commitments.

The Pact urges the SG to actively use his/her good offices and ensure the UN is adequately equipped to lead and support mediation and preventive diplomacy. It proposes to develop mechanisms for the **peaceful settlement of disputes**, confidence-building, early warning and crisis management, at the sub-regional, regional and international levels; pursue confidence-building measures; and intensify the use of diplomacy and mediation.

The Pact proposes to address the risks posed by the illicit trade in **small arms and light weapons** through national prevention strategies and other means. Action 24 seeks to address transnational organized crime and related illicit financial flows through scaled up and comprehensive efforts.

Action 25 on **nuclear weapons** was among the most contentious parts of the Pact with several proposed languages dropped and/or rephrased during the negotiations (refer to the Key Developments section below for

details). It recommits to the goal of total elimination; calls on MS to honor and respect all existing security assurances, including those related to nuclear-weapon-free zones; and seeks to accelerate the implementation of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation commitments.

## HEADLINES:

- The Pact requests the SG to provide analysis on the impact of the global increase in **military expenditure** on the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals by the end of the 79<sup>th</sup> session.
- The Pact invites MS to enact national legislation, regulations and procedures on **international transfer of conventional arms and military equipment** to manage the risks that such transfers could facilitate, contribute or lead to violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law.
- Action 23 on **terrorism** proposes to revitalize efforts towards the conclusion of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism. It also seeks to enhance coordination among UN counter-terrorism efforts and address the terrorist threats posed by misuse of new and emerging technologies.
- The Pact proposes to strengthen and develop, where they do not exist, **national prevention strategies** and asks the UN system and the Peacebuilding Commission to provide support on the same to states where requested.
- The Rev. 5, while proposing to “advance further measures and appropriate international negotiations to prevent an arms race in **outer space**”, has dropped language that sought to “agreeing potential political commitments and legally-binding instruments with appropriate and effective provisions for verification”.
- Action 26a proposes to revitalize the role of the UN in **disarmament** and “start the preparation of the fourth special session (of the General Assembly) devoted to disarmament (SSOD-IV)”.
- The Pact proposes to pursue a world free from **chemical and biological weapons**. Action 26d proposes to “identify, examine and develop effective measures, including possible legally-binding measures, to strengthen and institutionalise international norms and instruments against ... biological agents and toxins as weapons”.
- Action 28b proposes to “advance with urgency discussions on **Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)** through the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of LAWS with the aim to develop an instrument, without prejudging its nature, and other possible measures ...”. The language in Rev. 1 was to “conclude by 2026” which has been dropped since.
- The Pact requests the SG to carry out a second independent progress study on youth’s positive contribution to peace processes and conflict resolution by the end of 80<sup>th</sup> session.
- The Rev. 4 and Rev. 5 welcomes the elaboration of the draft UN Convention against **Cybercrime**.

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS:

- The Rev. 2 added a dedicated Action 17 proposing to take steps to ensure that the **International Court of Justice (ICJ)** can fully and effectively discharge its mandate. The Action on ICJ has been maintained, although with minor changes, through Rev. 3, 4 and 5, indicating continued support among MS.
- The Action on the impact of **climate change** on international peace & security has been dropped in Rev. 5. In Rev. 3, the Action proposed for relevant UN intergovernmental organs to consider and address the adverse effects of climate change to international peace and security, which we assume includes the Security Council. While the Rev. 4 had some remnants of the Rev. 3 language, it explicitly stated that the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the primary “international, intergovernmental forum” for negotiating the global response to climate change. However, this bridging language doesn’t seem to have enjoyed consensus among MS and hence dropped in Rev. 5.
- Action 20 on **Youth, Peace and Security** has been added since Rev. 2 and seeks to take voluntary measures to increase the representation of youth in conflict prevention and resolution.

- Action 22 on **maritime security and safety** was added in Rev. 2 and maintained since. However, the Rev. 2 language proposing to “explore options to develop new instruments, frameworks, and mechanisms to monitor, prevent and respond to” threats to maritime security and safety has been dropped in Rev. 3 and later versions.
- In Rev. 2 and after, the action item proposing to improve support to **peace enforcement actions** using UN assessed contributions and other sources of financing has been dropped. To carry out such peace enforcement actions, regional organizations or arrangements and multinational coalitions was mentioned in the zero-draft but was dropped since Rev. 1.
- The zero-draft language to half violent deaths by 2030 was rephrased to “quantifiably reduce violent deaths” without a target in Rev. 1 and has been dropped since Rev. 2.
- The Rev. 2 action item encouraging the permanent members of the Security Council to refrain from the **use of veto** in situations of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, which was edited to “commit to support timely and decisive action, in particular by the Security Council” without mention of veto in Rev. 3, has been dropped since Rev. 4.
- Language proposing to address the risks posed by misinformation and disinformation to the safety of UN peace personnel has been dropped in Rev. 4 and Rev. 5.
- The explicit reference to “medical personnel” as those who must be protected in conflict situations have been dropped in Rev. 3 and after.
- The Rev. 1 language to “establish robust mechanisms, such as norms, rules and principles throughout the life-cycle of **military applications of artificial intelligence**” has been dropped and instead replaced with “identify and address the risks” in Rev. 2, Rev. 3 and Rev. 4, and further changed to “continue to assess” the risks in Rev. 5.
- The Action on misuse of **digital technologies** was dropped in Rev. 5. While a couple of action items on military applications of artificial intelligence and addressing digital divides have been retained in other parts of Rev. 5, the action item on responsible state behavior in the use of Information & Communication Technologies (ICTs) and development on norms on the same have been dropped in Rev. 5.
- The Rev. 1 request to the SG to present options for a multilateral accountability mechanism to support adherence to responsible State behavior in the use of ICTs has been dropped in Rev. 2 and after.
- The Rev. 4 and Rev. 5 have removed language, added in Rev. 3, calling on nuclear-weapon States “to provide assurances (presumably, new assurances) against the use or threat of use of **nuclear weapons** against non-nuclear-weapon States”.
- The Rev. 1 action item calling specifically on nuclear-weapon States to “engage in and intensify dialogue on strategic stability ... (and) to elaborate next steps for nuclear disarmament” has been dropped in Rev. 2 and after.
- The Rev. 4 and Rev. 5 have deleted the Rev. 3 action item which proposed MS to “undertake further efforts, especially by the nuclear-weapon States, to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons ... including by taking steps to critically review the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies and avoiding a nuclear arms race”.

## RESOURCES:

1. ICH Bulletins on Chapter 2 ([#27](#), [#37](#), [#45](#), [#58](#), and [#63](#))
2. [ICH Bulletin #25](#) on the zero-draft
3. [SOTF website](#) (contains letters from the co-facilitators and [Rev. 1](#), [Rev. 2](#), [Rev. 3](#), and [Rev. 4](#))