

Comparing the Rev. 3 of Chapter 2 on International Peace and Security to the Zero Draft, Rev. 1 and Rev. 2

ABOUT: *The co-facilitators of the Summit of the Future (SOTF), following informal consultations and written inputs from MS and stakeholders in December 2023, published the [zero-draft](#) of the Pact for the Future on 26 January 2024. The 5-chapter zero-draft was meant to serve as a starting point for formal intergovernmental negotiations leading up to the SOTF in September 2024.*

A chapter-by-chapter First Reading was organized in early February following which a 242-page compilation text around the skeleton of the zero draft was circulated among Member States (MS). A paragraph-by-paragraph Second Reading was organised intermittently from late February until early April following which a 224-page revised compilation text was circulated among MS on 3 April 2024 (refer the [ICH bulletin #27](#) on First and Second Readings). The [Rev. 1](#) of the Pact for the Future was released on 14 May 2024 following closed informal consultation at Ambassador level and a virtual consultation with MGoS and civil society in April and the UN Civil Society Conference in Nairobi in May. The Rev. 1, as outlined by the co-facilitators in their [letter dated 4 April](#), was meant to be a concise, action-oriented and high-level political document as opposed to the zero-draft, which was meant to serve as a starting point for formal negotiations (refer the [ICH bulletin #37](#) comparing the Rev. 1 and the zero-draft).

The [Rev. 2](#) of the Pact for the Future was released on 17 July following extensive Third Readings held dispersedly between late May to early July (refer the [ICH bulletin #45](#) comparing the Rev. 2 to the Rev. 1 and the zero-draft). Following further consultations in late July and August, the co-facilitators released the [Rev. 3](#) on 27 August. This ICH bulletin #58 compares the Rev. 3 of Ch. 2 on International Peace and Security to the Rev. 2, Rev. 1 and the zero-draft while also referring to the compilation text (as of 3 April) for detailed insights as needed. Kindly refer to the Methodology section in page 3 for more details.

NOTE 1: The parts of the bulletin that was written or summarized by the Lead Author has been *italicized*. The non-italicized or quoted parts are excerpts. An index for the comparison part of the bulletin is given in page 3.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2:

“Deliberate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure” is added to the scene-setting paragraph of Action 14 in Rev. 3. Reference to General Assembly (GA) resolutions in the context of enabling humanitarian access has been added. Although the scope of action item 14h has been broadened to include “crime of aggression” and resolutions by both the Security Council and the GA, the key detail of the Rev. 2 language which is to “refrain from the use of the veto” has been dropped.

The addition of the protection of “United Nations and associated personnel, including national and locally recruited personnel ...” in armed conflict is significant given the recent spike in death of UN personnel in conflict situations. Threats posed by misinformation and disinformation to UN peace personnel has been mentioned in Rev. 3.

The Rev. 3 adds stateless persons and the non-refoulement principle. Partnerships with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) has been added in the context of humanitarian emergencies. The Rev. 3 proposes to redouble efforts to eliminate “all forms of violence against all women and girls” broadening the scope in Ch. 2 from just “sexual and gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence” as in the Rev. 2.

¹ DISCLAIMER: This bulletin is intended to provide an overview of the latest developments and is not a comprehensive summary or record of the SOTF processes. It was prepared independently, and the content does not reflect the specific views of any of the partner organizations. Contact Fergus Watt (ferguswatt6@gmail.com) for more information. Material is not copyrighted and can be distributed freely.

² Kindly note that this executive summary only discusses the major changes between Rev. 2 and Rev. 3. Most changes between the zero-draft, Rev. 1 and Rev. 2 (covered in detail in ICH Bulletins [#37](#) and [#45](#)) which have been maintained in Rev. 3, potentially indicating consensus, are not discussed again here.

National ownership, priorities and efforts in the context of conflict prevention have been explicitly mentioned in more instances in the Rev. 3. An action item requesting the SG to provide examples and best practices on prevention strategies was added in Rev. 2 but is now dropped in Rev. 3.

“Loss of biodiversity, desertification, water scarcity and water risks” are added to the list of environmental risks whose impacts on international peace and security the UN is asked to consider and address. In addition, the language of Action 21 in Rev. 3 has added impacts “that could contribute to the onset and escalation of conflict” – the “onset” more so and “escalation” relatively less so could be indicating a preventive approach.

On nuclear weapons, the Rev. 3 language “recommit(ing) to the goal”, while reaffirming the end goal, it might not provide the mandate or push for the progress needed towards the goal. The Rev. 3 has added a new action item 26b which proposes to undertake further efforts, especially by the nuclear-weapon States, to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons. The Rev. 3 language is edited to “provide assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States” which indicates a call for new assurances as opposed to existing ones in Rev. 2.

The scope of the instrument envisaged on lethal autonomous weapons has been changed and limited in Rev. 3 to “emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems” as opposed to language in Rev. 2 which is “including to (indicating more elements) address the risks posed by lethal autonomous weapons”.

HEADLINES:

- *Minor additions (or caveats) have been made in Action 13 on building and sustaining peaceful, inclusive and just societies indicating consensus on the language.*
- *The language on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas has changed from “avoid at all costs” in Rev. 1 to “refrain” in the Rev. 2 to “restrict or refrain, as appropriate” in action item 14c in Rev. 3.*
- *The Action Item 14e has been expanded in Rev. 3 but seems to have dropped reference to “medical personnel”, which the Lead Author assumes was a mistake on the part of the co-facilitators.*
- *A new action item 14i inviting MS to “enact national legislation, regulations and procedures, where they do not already exist, to exercise control over the international transfer of conventional arms and military equipment” has been added in Rev. 3.*
- *Famine-like conditions has been added in Rev. 3 in both the scene-setting and action item as one of the situations MS are expressing concern about and one that must be eliminated.*
- *The Rev. 3 has dropped “the value of its (International Court of Justice (ICJ)) work for the promotion of the rule of law”. In addition, the language of Action 17 has itself been changed – “fulfil our commitment” is now “fulfil our obligation” and upholding the mandate of the ICJ is added. This might be an indication of the continued support for ICJ in the GA.*
- *Only few minor changes in Action 19 on Women, Peace and Security, potentially signaling consensus on the language.*
- *The Rev. 3 has added a new action item requesting the SG to “carry out the second independent progress study on youth’s positive contribution to peace processes and conflict resolution”.*
- *The Rev. 1 language encouraging the SG to convene an annual high-level meeting with relevant regional organizations to discuss peace operations has been dropped in Rev. 2 but is again brought back in Rev. 3.*
- *The Rev. 2 language proposing to “explore options to develop new instruments, frameworks, and mechanisms to monitor, prevent and respond to” threats to maritime security and safety has been dropped in Rev. 3.*
- *Very few minor changes in Action 27 on upholding disarmament obligations and commitments potentially signaling consensus.*