



# SUMMIT OF THE FUTURE INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE

## BULLETIN NO. 37:

### Comparing the Rev. 1 of Chapter 2 on International Peace and Security to the Zero Draft



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## Comparing the Rev. 1 of Chapter 2 on International Peace and Security to the Zero Draft

**ABOUT:** The co-facilitators of the Summit of the Future (SOTF), following informal consultations and written inputs from MS and stakeholders in December 2023, published the [zero-draft](#) of the Pact for the Future on 26 January 2024. The 5-chapter zero-draft was meant to serve as a starting point for formal intergovernmental negotiations leading up to the SOTF in September 2024.

A chapter-by-chapter First Reading was organized in early February following which a 242-page compilation text around the skeleton of the zero draft was circulated among Member States (MS). A paragraph-by-paragraph Second Reading was organised intermittently from late February until early April following which a 224-page revised compilation text was circulated among MS on 3 April 2024 (refer [here](#) for the ICH bulletin on First and Second Readings). The [Rev. 1](#) of the Pact for the Future was released on 14 May 2024 following closed informal consultation at Ambassador level and a virtual consultation with MGoS and civil society in April and the UN Civil Society Conference in Nairobi in May. The Rev. 1, as outlined by the co-facilitators in their [letter dated 4 April](#), was meant to be a concise, action-oriented and high-level political document as opposed to the zero-draft, which was meant to serve as a starting point for formal negotiations.

This bulletin #37 compares the Rev. 1 of Ch. 2 on International Peace and Security to the zero-draft while also referring to the compilation text for detailed insights as needed. Kindly refer to the Methodology section in page 4 for more details.

**NOTE <sup>1</sup>:** The parts of the bulletin that was written or summarized by the Lead Author has been *italicized*. The non-italicized parts are excerpts from the Rev. 1, zero-draft, or the compilation text. An index for the comparison part of the bulletin is given in page 4.

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

The SG's policy brief on a [New Agenda for Peace](#) has not been mentioned in the action part of Ch. 2 but is acknowledged in the introductory or scene-setting paragraph in Rev. 1. The request in the zero-draft for the SG to strengthen the UN's approach to preventive diplomacy building on the principles set out in the New Agenda for Peace has been dropped.

In the First and Second Readings several MS, particularly Liechtenstein and South Africa, proposed to add language on the importance of the [International Court of Justice](#), which has now been included in the scene-setting part of Ch. 2.

The Rev. 1 has added more on the topic of [military expenditure](#) and has requested the SG to “provide analysis on the impact of the global increase in military expenditure on the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals”.

Action 12 in the Rev. 1 proposes to take concrete and practical steps to protect [civilians in armed conflict](#) and has agreed to protect medical personnel, journalists and media persons in addition to humanitarian personnel.

Language to address the root causes of [forced and protracted displacement](#) has now been added in Action 13(a) based on proposals by several MS. The Rev. 1 further proposes to significantly increase financial and other forms of support to countries facing humanitarian crises, including innovative and anticipatory financing, which was proposed by the EU, the Philippines and Colombia.

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<sup>1</sup> DISCLAIMER: This bulletin is intended to provide an overview of the latest developments and is not a comprehensive summary or record of the SOTF processes. It was prepared independently, and the content does not reflect the specific views of any of the partner organizations. Contact Fergus Watt ([ferguswatt6@gmail.com](mailto:ferguswatt6@gmail.com)) for more information. Material is not copyrighted and can be distributed freely.

The Rev. 1 adds early warning mechanisms to the list of actions to defuse tensions among countries. Language to address environmental and climate impacts on peace and security, including as part of the mandates of peace operations, has largely been retained in Rev. 1.

Language on **Women, Peace and Security Agenda** has been made more action oriented from “we recognize the necessity of urgently advancing its implementation” to “redouble our efforts to ... tackle persistent barriers to the implementation”. Sexual and gender-based violence, which wasn’t mentioned in the zero-draft, has now been added in Rev. 1.

**National prevention strategies**, which wasn’t mentioned in the zero-draft, has been given a stronger focus in Rev. 1. The Peacebuilding Commission and the entire UN system have been tasked to provide support to MS based on request to build national capacity to develop and implement national prevention strategies. The Rev. 1 proposes to pursue stronger alignment between international and regional financial institutions to support the national prevention and peacebuilding efforts of MS.

**UN Peace Operations** – Both the zero-draft and Rev. 1 calls on the Security Council to ensure peace operations are deployed with clear and prioritized mandates, exit strategies and viable transition plans, and as part of a comprehensive approach to sustaining peace. The Rev. 1 asks the SG to provide recommendations for consideration of MS rather than “to continue to develop new models of peace operations”.

The language to improve financial support, including from assessed contributions, to peace enforcement actions has been maintained with the removal of those “carried out regional organizations or arrangements, or other multinational coalitions”. Although shortened, the essence of the Security Council resolution 2719(2023) to ensure adequate, predictable and sustainable **financing for African Union-led peace support operations** has been maintained.

**Terrorism** – The Rev. 1 proposes to “adopt a balanced and comprehensive approach to counter terrorism” instead of “preventive measures” as in the zero-draft. It has more action-oriented language on addressing the risks posed by new and emerging technologies in the context of terrorism.

The integration of risks posed by **small arms** in national prevention strategies, mentioned above, has been proposed. The Rev. 1 proposes to “take concrete steps to detect, investigate and prosecute illicit arms and ammunition and related financial flows” while dropping detailed language found in the zero-draft, including those related to targets and road maps.

**Nuclear Weapons** – The Rev. 1 is calling on Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) to “prevent any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” in which the “threat of use” was added. The erosion of international norms against the “possession ... of nuclear weapons” was added in Rev. 1 in addition to their spread, testing and use. It calls on NWS to engage in and intensify dialogue to “elaborate next steps for nuclear disarmament, including further reductions of nuclear arsenals”.

**Disarmament** – The zero-draft language committing to pursue “agreements on disarmament and the regulation of arms” was among the most contentious during the First and Second Readings. This has now been edited to “we will ... support progressive efforts to effectively regulate arms” in Rev. 1. Language revitalizing the role of the UN in the field of disarmament has been retained.

Rev. 1 tackles **chemical and biological weapons**, which wasn’t mentioned in the zero-draft. It further proposes to anticipate, coordinate and prepare for biological risks, whether caused by natural, accidental or deliberate release of biological agents.

**Outer Space** – The Rev. 1 proposes to “launch negotiations on legally binding and non-legally binding instruments to ensure peace, security and the prevention of an arms race in outer space”. This is a departure from the language in zero-draft which proposed a treaty. A further change is the non-mention of the forum for such negotiations, which in the zero-draft was relevant disarmament bodies of the UN.

The Rev. 1, unlike the zero-draft, mentions 2026 as the timeframe to conclude “legally binding instruments to prohibit **autonomous weapons systems** that select targets and apply force without human control, and to regulate all other types of autonomous weapons systems”.



Language on responsible state behaviour in the use of **Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs)** has been strengthened in Rev. 1, including a request to the SG to present options for a multilateral accountability mechanism to support adherence to agreed norms, rules and principles. The international cooperation aspect of preventing and combatting cybercrime and crimes committed through the use of ICTs has been strengthened.

The Rev. 1 calls to “strengthen transparency, accountability and oversight mechanisms for the use, development and deployment of data-driven technology, including artificial intelligence”. It further calls for “establish(ing) ... norms, rules and principles throughout the life-cycle of **military applications of artificial intelligence**”.

## HEADLINES:

- Language committing to “investigate alleged violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law and ensure accountability” in OP55 of the zero-draft, which is relatively more action-oriented, has been rephrased in Action 12(f) to “redouble our efforts to end impunity and ensure accountability”, which is more input-based language.
- The Youth, Peace and Security Agenda seem to have been dropped in Ch. 2 of the Rev. 1. The inclusive participation of youth in conflict prevention and other peace processes is mentioned in Ch. 4 Action 34 (e) but at the national level.
- The issue of famine has been tackled in the Rev. 1 with the proposal to “eliminate the scourge of famine now and for future generations”.
- The reference to Article 33 of the UN Charter, which deals with tools for the pacific settlement of disputes, has been removed from Rev. 1.
- The zero-draft language to half violent deaths by 2030 has been rephrased to “quantifiably reduce violent deaths” without a target.
- The Rev. 1 has dropped the exercise to undertake a comprehensive reflection on the future of peace operations proposed in the zero-draft.
- The Rev. 1 encourages the SG to convene an annual high-level meeting with relevant regional organizations to discuss matters pertaining to peace operations, peacebuilding and conflicts.
- References to subregional organizations in the context of peace operations and related financing has been removed in Rev. 1.
- The Rev. 1 proposes to “revitalize efforts towards the conclusion of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism”.
- During the First and Second Readings, several MS proposed language calling for “early commencement of negotiations on effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances to all NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States) by all the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances”
- Zero-draft language committing to “strengthen measures to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors” has been dropped in Rev. 1 despite no opposition recorded in the compilation text as of 3 April.
- The Rev. 1 recommends to “hold a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD-IV)”.
- The zero-draft had no mention of chemical and biological weapons. The Rev. 1 now proposes to “pursue a world free from chemical and biological weapons”.
- The Rev. 1 requests the SG to present options for a multilateral accountability mechanism to support adherence to agreed norms, rules and principles of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs.

## METHODOLOGY:

*This ICH bulletin has compared the Rev. 1 of the Pact for the Future to the zero-draft. The content from the zero-draft (not in its entirety and not in order) is included in column 1 in the comparison table below and the content from the Rev. 1 is included in column 2 and in the Action, title rows in its entirety. The numerical or alphabetical references as in the zero-draft and Rev. 1 are included in all cases in column 1 and 2. The column 3 on “Observations” was written by the Lead Author based on the compilation text and insights accumulated by tracking the SOTF negotiations since early 2023. The parts of the bulletin that are written or summarized by the Lead Author are italicized, as mentioned in the note in page 1. The content from the zero-draft that has been removed in the Rev. 1 has been indicated by **yellow highlights** in column 1 and the content that has been added in the Rev. 1 but not found in the zero draft are indicated by **green highlights** in column 2. Few parts of excerpts have been edited out to optimize space and reduce repetitions and these have been indicated by “/.../”.*

## RESOURCES:

1. [Zero draft of the Pact for the Future](#)
2. [Compilation text \(as of 3 April 2024\)](#)
3. [Rev. 1 of the Pact for the Future](#)
4. [Letter from the co-facilitators](#) (dated 4 April 2024)

## INDEX:

*The Rev. 1 starts off with a couple of introductory paragraphs and then is organized by Action Items. The same order has been followed in this bulletin and below are the page numbers for each Action Items.*

	<b>Action Item</b>	<b>Page No</b>
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## COMPARISON:

### Introductory paragraphs for Ch. 2 in Rev. 1

14. We are gravely concerned about the accumulating threats to international peace and security on land, sea, in the air, in outer space and in cyberspace, some of which pose an existential threat to humanity. The United Nations has a unique responsibility for, and an indispensable role in, the maintenance of international peace and security. There is an urgent need to build trust, strengthen solidarity and deepen cooperation, building on the recommendations in the New Agenda for Peace.

15. We strongly reaffirm our duty to act in accordance with the Charter, including its purposes and principles, and our full respect for the sovereign equality of all Member States, the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and our obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. We also reaffirm our commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to international law and we underline the central importance of the International Court of Justice.

Zero Draft	Rev. 1	Observations
<p>49. We welcome the recommendations by the Secretary-General in the New Agenda for Peace to enhance the toolbox of the Charter to prevent the outbreak, escalation and recurrence of hostilities on land, at sea, in space and in cyberspace, to address the interrelated global threats to international peace and security, and to deliver on the promises of the Charter</p> <p>64. We request that the Secretary-General take concrete steps to strengthen the United Nations approach to preventive diplomacy in the current geopolitical context, building on the principles set out in the New Agenda for Peace.</p>	<p>14. There is an urgent need to build trust, strengthen solidarity and deepen cooperation, building on the recommendations in the New Agenda for Peace</p>	<p><i>The SG's policy brief on a New Agenda for Peace has only been mentioned in the scene-setting part of Ch. 2 (and not in the Actions part) in Rev. 1 of the Pact for the Future.</i></p> <p><i>A notable edit is the lack of mention of New Agenda for Peace in the context of preventive diplomacy, which was found in the Zero Draft.</i></p>
<p>47. We reaffirm our commitment to the Charter, including its purposes and principles, and international law, and to acting collectively and cooperatively to promote peace and prevent conflicts. We also reaffirm diplomacy and dialogue as the primary means to settle disputes and overcome divisions peacefully.</p>	<p>15. We strongly reaffirm our duty to act in accordance with the Charter, including its purposes and principles, and our full respect for the sovereign equality of all Member States, the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and our obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the</p>	<p><i>Rev. 1 has significantly added language on self-determination, use of force and ICJ (highlighted in green in column 2). The addition of ICJ was proposed repeatedly by several MS, as seen in the compilation text of 3 April, particularly Liechtenstein, South Africa and Mexico, among others.</i></p>

	<p><b>territorial integrity or political independence of any state.</b></p> <p>We also reaffirm our commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to international law and <b>we underline the central importance of the International Court of Justice.</b></p>	<p><i>The Rev. 1 expressly mentions the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in Ch. 2, which wasn't the case in the zero-draft, where it instead mentions international human rights law.</i></p>
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**Action 11. We will redouble our efforts to build peaceful and inclusive societies.**

16. We recognize the interdependence of international peace and security, sustainable development and human rights and we reaffirm the importance of the rule of law. We are concerned about the growing imbalance between military expenditures and investments in sustainable development and sustaining peace. We agree to:

<b>Zero Draft</b>	<b>Rev. 1</b>	<b>Observations</b>
<p>50. We recognize the interdependence of international peace and security, sustainable development and human rights.</p> <p>51. We recommit to accelerating the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals to strengthen resilience and comprehensively address underlying drivers and enablers of violence and insecurity and the consequences thereof, which is central to international peace and security</p> <p>50. We reaffirm the need to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies that provide equal access to justice and are based on human rights, the rule of law and good governance at all levels and on transparent, effective and accountable institutions. In this regard, we recognize the importance of fostering a culture of peace, upholding the rule of law and promoting human security.</p>	<p>We recognize the interdependence of international peace and security; sustainable development and human rights and we reaffirm the importance of the rule of law</p> <p>(a) Strengthen resilience and comprehensively address underlying drivers and root causes of armed conflict, violence, and insecurity and their consequences by accelerating the investment in and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals.</p> <p>(b) Provide equal access to justice, protect civic space and uphold human rights for all, including through promoting a culture of peace and enhancing human security.</p>	<p><i>The “importance of rule of law” has been added in the Rev. 1.</i></p> <p><i>“Armed conflict” has been added along with violence and insecurity. Regarding SDGs, the Rev. 1 has added the word “investment in” along with implementation.</i></p> <p><i>Both references to “rule of law” and one reference to “good governance” have been (re)moved in the Rev. 1.</i></p>

<p>52. We reaffirm that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interrelated, interdependent and mutually reinforcing and that all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights must be treated in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis, and that they are essential to international peace and security as necessary guarantees of inclusive societies and protection against marginalization and discrimination.</p>		<p><i>The OP52 in the Zero Draft on “all human rights” has now been moved to Action 42 in the Rev. 1 document, which is in Ch. 5. This could potentially be as a result of the methodology taken by the co-facilitators to draft the Rev. 1 (as stated in their letter dated 4 April) following the First and Second Readings where it says “we will eliminate redundancies and duplication both across and within chapters”</i></p>
	<p><b>Action 11:</b> We are concerned about the growing imbalance between military expenditures and investments in sustainable development and sustaining peace</p> <p>(c) Ensure that spending on arms does not come at the expense of investment in sustainable development and building sustainable peace.</p> <p>(d) Request the Secretary-General to provide analysis on the impact of the global increase in military expenditure on the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals by the end of the seventy-ninth session.</p>	<p><i>The theme on military expenditure has been added in the Rev. 1. This has been raised by MS, including Brazil, Bangladesh, Mexico, among others, during the First and Second Readings.</i></p>
<p><b>Action 12. We will protect all civilians in armed conflict.</b></p>		
<p>17. We recognize the devastating impact of armed conflict on civilians, civilian infrastructure and cultural heritage, and we are particularly concerned about the impact of violence on women and children in armed conflict. Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are prohibited under international law. We recommit to our obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international refugee law. We agree to:</p>		
<p><b>Zero Draft</b></p>	<p><b>Rev. 1</b></p>	<p><b>Observations</b></p>
	<p>/.../ Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are prohibited under international law. We recommit to our</p>	<p><i>International refugee law was only mentioned in the context of enforcement action authorized by the Security Council to maintain</i></p>



<p>55. We also <b>commit to investigate alleged violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law</b> and ensure accountability of perpetrators.</p>	<p>obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international refugee law</p> <p>(f) Redouble our efforts to end impunity and ensure accountability for atrocity crimes, and other gross violations such as the use of starvation of civilians as a method of war, gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence.</p>	<p><i>or restore international peace and security in the zero draft. In the Rev. 1, it has been mentioned in the context of armed conflict. Switzerland and Morocco, among others, have consistently raised refugee law during the First and Second Readings.</i></p> <p><i>The language committing to “investigate alleged violations”, which is relatively more action-oriented, has been rephrased to “redouble our efforts to end impunity and ensure accountability”, which is a more input-based language.</i></p>
<p>55. We agree to strengthen the protection of civilians, including in populated areas of conflict zones and enhance mechanisms to mitigate harm to civilians</p>	<p>(a) Take concrete and practical steps to protect all civilians in armed conflict, in particular vulnerable groups.</p> <p>(c) Avoid at all costs the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, especially near schools and medical facilities.</p>	<p><i>The language in Rev. 1 is to “take concrete and practical steps” compared to the zero draft where it says, “we agree to strengthen”.</i></p>
<p><b>60. We commit to strengthen the youth, peace and security agenda including through the meaningful and inclusive participation of youth in conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, peace processes, post-conflict processes and humanitarian action, ...</b></p> <p>... as well as to take concrete measures to further protect youth and children in armed conflict situations.</p>	<p>(b) Accelerate the implementation of our commitments under the children and armed conflict agenda</p>	<p><i>The item on “youth, peace and security agenda” seem to have been dropped in Ch. 2 of the Rev. 1. The inclusive participation of youth in conflict prevention and other peace processes is mentioned in Ch. 4 Action 34 (e) but at the national level.</i></p> <p><i>The language on children and armed conflict has been changed from “take concrete measures” to “accelerate the implementation”.</i></p>
<p>54. /.../ we reaffirm our commitment to the full respect of international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and to granting humanitarian access, in line with resolution</p>	<p>(d) Enable safe, rapid and unimpeded humanitarian access and assistance, and full respect for the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.</p>	<p><i>The reference to resolution 46/182 has been dropped. This could be in line with the methodology outlined by the co-facilitators in their letter dated 4 April.</i></p>

46/182 and humanitarian principles		
56. We commit to the protection of all humanitarian personnel, in line with international humanitarian law and international human rights law.	(e) Protect all humanitarian and <b>medical personnel</b> and commit to protect all <b>journalists and media in armed conflict.</b>	<i>References to medical personnel, journalists and media has been added in Rev. 1.</i>
<p><b>Action 13. We will ensure people affected by humanitarian crises receive the support they need.</b></p>		
<p>18. We express grave concern at the unprecedented number of people affected by humanitarian emergencies, including those experiencing forced and increasingly protracted displacement and those afflicted by famine. We agree to:</p>		
<b>Zero Draft</b>	<b>Rev. 1</b>	<b>Observations</b>
57. We express our grave concern at the unprecedented number of people affected by humanitarian emergencies, including forced and increasingly protracted displacement which are growing in number, scale and severity	<p>We express grave concern at the unprecedented number of people affected by humanitarian emergencies, including those experiencing forced and increasingly protracted displacement and <b>those afflicted by famine</b></p> <p>(b) <b>Eliminate the scourge of famine now and for future generations, deploying all the knowledge, resources and capacities at our disposal</b></p>	<i>Famine has been added to the action items in Rev. 1. There was no reference to famine in the zero-draft.</i>
57. We note that, despite the unprecedented generosity of host countries and donors, the gap between needs and humanitarian funding continues to grow.	<p>(a) <b>Address the root causes of forced and protracted displacement and implement durable solutions, including through equitable international burden and responsibility sharing, and support to host communities.</b></p> <p>(c) Significantly increase financial and other forms of support for countries and communities facing humanitarian crises, including by scaling up <b>innovative and anticipatory financing mechanisms.</b></p>	<p><i>The addition of Action 13 (a) has been proposed in different forms by several MS, including LMG-2, Bangladesh, Canada, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, UK, GCC, among others.</i></p> <p><i>The language on finance has been changed from noting the gap to “significantly increase”. In addition, innovative and anticipatory financing mechanisms has been added, which was proposed by the EU, the Philippines and Colombia.</i></p>

**Action 14. We will defuse tensions, promote cooperation and understanding between Member States and seek the pacific settlement of disputes.**

19. We recognize the United Nations' unique role in preventive diplomacy. We agree to:

Zero Draft	Rev. 1	Observations
<p>61. We recognize that the United Nations is the most inclusive organization for international diplomacy and a unique platform for preventive diplomacy, in line with the Charter and international law</p> <p>64. We request that the Secretary-General take concrete steps to strengthen the United Nations approach to preventive diplomacy in the current geopolitical context, building on the principles set out in the New Agenda for Peace.</p>	<p>We recognize the United Nations' unique role in preventive diplomacy</p>	<p><i>The instances of mention of preventive diplomacy have been reduced from 2 to 1 in the zero-draft and Rev. 1, respectively.</i></p> <p><i>The mention of New Agenda for Peace in the context of preventive diplomacy, found in the zero-draft, was removed.</i></p>
<p>63. We commit to developing new, and revitalizing existing, confidence-building and crisis management mechanisms</p> <p>65. We strongly encourage Member States to strengthen and develop regional frameworks for the prevention of conflict with the aim of reducing regional tensions and facilitating cooperation among Member States through concrete steps and protocols that build trust and confidence between States, including regional security architectures.</p>	<p>(a) Revitalize existing, and develop and implement new, confidence-building, <b>early warning</b> and crisis management mechanisms, at the sub-regional, regional, and international level.</p>	<p><i>“Early warning” mechanisms has now been added. The OP63 and OP65 of the zero-draft have been condensed to a generic and high-level language in Rev. 1.</i></p>
<p><b>62. We commit to availing ourselves of the tools referred to in Article 33 of the Charter to seek pacific settlements of disputes.</b></p>		<p><i>The reference to Article 33 of the UN Charter has been removed in Rev. 1.</i></p>
<p><b>62. We also reaffirm diplomacy and dialogue as the primary means to settle disputes and overcome divisions peacefully</b></p>		<p><i>The zero-draft mentions “diplomacy and dialogue as the primary means to settle disputes and overcome divisions” twice, which the Rev. 1 has dropped (or alternatively might’ve been rephrased too far from the</i></p>

<p>63. We further commit to supporting mediation efforts, including the use of the good offices of the Secretary-General.</p> <p>64. We request that the Secretary-General take concrete steps to strengthen the United Nations approach to preventive diplomacy in the current geopolitical context, building on the principles set out in the New Agenda for Peace.</p>	<p>(b) Intensify the use of diplomacy, the good offices of the Secretary-General, and mediation efforts to ease tensions in situations which may pose a threat to international peace and security, and ensure the United Nations is adequately equipped in this regard.</p>	<p><i>original language, which the author is not able to track).</i></p> <p><i>“We further commit” has been edited to “intensify”.</i></p> <p><i>The language requesting the SG to <b>strengthen</b> the UN’s approach to preventive diplomacy has been dropped and instead replaced with “ensure the UN is <b>adequately equipped</b> in this regard” without attribution to the SG. Notable edit is the removal of the New Agenda for Peace.</i></p>
<p><b>Action 15. We will build and sustain peace at the national level.</b></p> <p>20. We recognize that Member States are responsible for preventing conflict and building peace in their countries. Adequate, sustainable, flexible and predictable financing for peacebuilding is essential, and we welcome the recent Security Council decision to increase the resources available to the United Nations’ Peacebuilding Fund. We agree to:</p>		
Zero Draft	Rev. 1	Observations
<p>66. /.../ We affirm that all Member States have the responsibility to prevent conflict and build peace in their countries, <b>through approaches based on national ownership and nationally defined priorities and anchored in all-of-government and all-of-society approaches centred on human rights, rule of law and human dignity.</b></p> <p>67. We welcome the decision to establish the Peacebuilding Account, as a modality of financing the Peacebuilding Fund, and <b>to approve 50 million United States dollars of assessed contributions to fund the Account, starting on 1 January 2025</b></p>	<p>We recognize that Member States are responsible for preventing conflict and building peace in their countries.</p> <p>Adequate, sustainable, flexible and predictable financing for peacebuilding is essential, and we welcome the recent Security Council decision to increase the resources available to the United Nations’ Peacebuilding Fund</p>	<p><i>Similar language has been maintained, except for the removal of the principles listed in the zero-draft.</i></p> <p><i>The specifics have been removed potentially due to the methodology outlined by the co-facilitators to “minimize ... references to existing resolutions ... and take a judicious approach to the level of technical detail in the Pact”.</i></p>
<p>51. We reaffirm our commitment to significantly reducing all forms of violence and we commit to halving violent death rates in all societies by 2030</p>	<p>(b) Develop <b>national prevention strategies</b> on a voluntary basis to address the drivers of violence and armed conflict, including</p>	<p><i>The Rev. 1 adds “national prevention strategies” which wasn’t present in the zero-draft. This was championed by the EU</i></p>



	efforts to quantifiably reduce violent deaths.	<i>and Switzerland, among other MS.</i>  <i>With that being said, the language on violent death rates has been edited from “halving ... by 2030” to “quantifiably reduce” without a target.</i>
	(a) Deliver on our commitment in Agenda 2030 to significantly reduce all forms of violence, including <b>sexual and gender-based violence</b> and our commitment to <b>eliminate conflict-related sexual violence</b>	<i>The zero-draft has no mentions of sexual and gender-based violence, which the Rev. 1 has addressed. This has been raised repeatedly in the First and Second Readings from a wide spectrum of MS.</i>
125. We reaffirm the role of the Peacebuilding Commission in providing peacebuilding and sustaining peace support to countries through political accompaniment and advocacy to countries affected by conflict, with their consent.	(c) Provide support and assistance to States, including through the Peacebuilding Commission and the entire United Nations system, upon request, to build national capacity to develop and implement their <b>national prevention strategies.</b>  (d) <b>Integrate the risks associated with small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, in all their aspects, into national prevention strategies.</b>	<i>The OP125 in Ch. 5 of the zero-draft is slightly related to Action Item 15 (c). As mentioned above, with the addition of national prevention strategies, the Peacebuilding Commission has been tasked with providing support upon request.</i>  <i>Language on integrating the risks of small arms within national prevention strategies was proposed by Colombia, Mexico and the EU, among other MS.</i>
	<b>(e) Address the risks to the stability and cohesion of our societies posed by disinformation and misinformation, including content disseminated through digital platforms, while respecting the right to freedom of expression</b>	<i>There is no reference to “disinformation” or “misinformation” in the zero-draft.</i>
68. We encourage closer cooperation between the international financial institutions and the United Nations to assist Member States in addressing the underlying causes of instability, sustaining peace, supporting inclusive sustainable development and implementing the 2030	(f) Pursue stronger alignment between the international and regional financial institutions and the needs of Member States affected by conflict and violence to support their national prevention and peacebuilding efforts.	<i>The language has changed from “encourage closer cooperation” to “pursue stronger alignment”, which is relatively more “action-oriented” as per resolution 76/307.</i>  <i>Regional financial institutions have been added. The references</i>

<p>Agenda, including through ensuring an integrated and well-coordinated approach to funding.</p>		<p><i>to “underlying causes of instability, sustaining peace, supporting inclusive sustainable development and implementing the 2030 Agenda” could be assumed to have been subsumed in Rev. 1 under the “national prevention and peacebuilding efforts”. OR alternatively the new language in Rev. 1 might be an effort to be less prescriptive of nationally owned efforts and approaches.</i></p>
<p><b>Action 16. We will accelerate the implementation of our commitments on women and peace and security.</b></p>		
<p>21. We recognize that the full, equal, safe, and meaningful participation of women in decisions on peace and security is essential to achieve sustainable peace. We condemn in the strongest terms the increased levels of violence against all women and girls, who are particularly at risk of violence in armed conflict, post-conflict situations and humanitarian settings. We agree to:</p>		
Zero Draft	Rev. 1	Observations
<p>59. We recognize the need to eliminate all forms of discrimination and violence against women and girls and to accelerate action to achieve gender equality in all domains</p>	<p>(b) Take concrete steps to eliminate the full range of threats and human rights violations and abuses experienced by all women and girls in armed conflict, post-conflict situations and humanitarian settings</p>	<p><i>The language on violence against women and girls has been strengthened from “we recognize the need” to “take concrete steps” while also specifying the scope in this chapter to “armed conflict, post-conflict situations and humanitarian settings”.</i></p>
<p>58. We reaffirm our collective commitments under the women and peace and security agenda, and we recognize the necessity of urgently advancing its implementation.</p>	<p>(a) Redouble our efforts to achieve gender equality and tackle the persistent barriers to the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda</p>	<p><i>The language on women and peace and security agenda has been made more action oriented from “we recognize the necessity of urgently advancing its implementation” to “redouble our efforts to ... tackle persistent barriers to the implementation”.</i></p>
<p><b>Action 17. We will address environmental and climate impacts on peace and security.</b></p>		
<p>22. We recognize that the adverse impacts of climate change, environmental degradation and biodiversity loss can exacerbate social tensions, instability and economic insecurity, increase humanitarian needs, and in some cases, contribute to the onset or escalation of conflict. We agree to:</p>		
Zero Draft	Rev. 1	Observations
<p>69. We encourage the relevant organs of the United Nations, as</p>	<p>(a) Ensure that relevant United Nations’ intergovernmental</p>	<p><i>Much of the language has been retained with the addition of</i></p>

<p>appropriate and within their respective mandates, to intensify their efforts in considering and addressing climate change, including its possible security implications. We urge the Security Council to address the peace and security implications of climate change in the mandates of peace operations and during discussions on other country or regional situations on its agenda, where relevant.</p>	<p>organs, including the Security Council, consider and address the adverse security impacts of climate change, environmental degradation and biodiversity loss, including as part of the mandate of peace operations, as appropriate.</p>	<p><i>environmental degradation and biodiversity loss and removal of “during discussions on other country or regional situations on its (Security Council’s) agenda”.</i></p> <p><i>Climate change is only considered in OP69 of Ch. 2 in the zero-draft. The Rev. 1 has elevated it to a dedicated Action Item.</i></p>
	<p><b>(b) Implement relevant intergovernmentally agreed commitments on climate change and the environment and build resilience in highly vulnerable countries and communities</b></p>	<p><i>Climate has been mentioned in Ch. 1 and in OP69 of Ch. 2 of the zero-draft. The language to implement intergovernmentally agreed commitments is new to Ch. 2.</i></p>
<p><b>Action 18. We will adapt peace operations and support peace enforcement to better respond to existing challenges and new realities.</b></p>		
<p>23. United Nations peace operations, including peacekeeping operations and special political missions, are critical tools to maintain international peace and security. They face increasingly complex challenges and urgently need to adapt, taking into account the needs of Member States, including those of host countries and troop- and police-contributing countries. We reaffirm the importance of enforcement action authorized by the Security Council, to maintain or restore international peace and security. We support enhanced collaboration between the United Nations and the African Union in this regard. We agree to:</p>		
<p><b>Zero Draft</b></p>	<p><b>Rev. 1</b></p>	<p><b>Observations</b></p>
<p>70. We acknowledge that peace operations can only succeed when political solutions to conflicts are actively pursued, and we request the Security Council to ensure that peace operations are deployed with clear and prioritized mandates, exit strategies and viable transition plans, and as part of a comprehensive approach to sustaining peace</p>	<p>(a) Call on the Security Council to ensure that peace operations are deployed with clear and prioritized mandates, exit strategies and viable transition plans, and as part of a comprehensive approach to sustaining peace <b>in full compliance with international law</b></p>	<p><i>Language largely retained with compliance with international law added.</i></p>
<p><b>72. We commit to undertaking an inclusive, comprehensive reflection on the future of peace operations, including peacekeeping.</b></p> <p>We request the Secretary-General to continue to develop new models</p>	<p>(b) Request the Secretary-General to provide strategic and action-</p>	<p><i>The Rev. 1 has dropped the exercise to “undertaking an inclusive, comprehensive reflection on the future of peace operations”.</i></p> <p><i>The Rev. 1 asks the SG to provide recommendations for</i></p>

<p>of peace operations that can respond to the evolving nature of conflict in traditional and new domains, while devising transition and exit strategies.</p>	<p>oriented recommendations for the consideration of Member States on the future of all forms of United Nations' peace operations and how the United Nations' toolbox can be adapted to meet evolving needs, to allow for more agile, tailored responses to existing, emerging and future challenges.</p>	<p><i>consideration of MS rather than “to continue to develop new models of peace operations”.</i></p>
	<p><b>(c) Encourage the Secretary General to convene an annual high-level meeting with relevant regional organizations to discuss matters pertaining to peace operations, peacebuilding and conflicts.</b></p> <p><b>(d) Take concrete steps to ensure the safety and security of the personnel of peace operations.</b></p>	<p><i>These two points are an addition in the Rev. 1.</i></p> <p><i>The safety and security of personnel of peace operations were raised by many MS in the First and Second Readings, including the call for the “establishment of a mechanism to ensure accountability for crime against peacekeepers including follow-up of the pending cases after the withdrawal of the mission”, which did not make its way to the Rev. 1.</i></p>
<p>74. We emphasize that such enforcement action, including in counter-terrorism contexts, must be accompanied by inclusive political efforts and other non-military approaches to advance peace, to avoid over-securitization and civilian harm, and to address conflict drivers and related grievances, and must be based on full compliance with obligations under international law, including the Charter and relevant international conventions and protocols, in particular international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law.</p>	<p>(e) Ensure that enforcement actions, including in counter-terrorism contexts, are accompanied by inclusive political efforts and other non-military approaches, and address the root causes and drivers of conflict and terrorism.</p>	<p><i>While the first half of the language has been more or less retained, the second part on compliance with international law and others has been edited out.</i></p>



<p>73. We reaffirm that enforcement action to maintain or restore international peace and security, authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter and <b>carried out by regional organizations or arrangements, or other multinational coalitions</b>, should be better supported, including, where needed, by adequate, predictable and sustainable financing, including through United Nations-assessed contributions.</p>	<p>(f) Improve support to peace enforcement action by adequate, predictable and sustainable financing, including through United Nations' assessed contributions</p>	<p><i>The language has been shortened significantly with nearly the same emphasis on the point (“should be better supported” and “improve support”).</i></p> <p><i>The mention of regional organizations or arrangements and multinational coalitions has been dropped. While Indonesia and the UK asked for “multinational coalitions” to be deleted, Brazil, Russia and the LMG-2 group asked for the whole OP73 be deleted from the zero-draft.</i></p>
<p>75. We welcome the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2719 (2023), in which the Council agreed to consider on a case-by-case basis requests from the African Union Peace and Security Council seeking authorization from the United Nations Security Council for African Union-led peace support operations under chapters VII and VIII of the Charter to have access to United Nations assessed contributions. We encourage enhanced collaboration between the United Nations and the African Union towards effective implementation of that resolution.</p> <p>We stress the need for adequate, predictable and sustainable financing for African Union and <b>subregional peace support operations</b> mandated by the Security Council</p>	<p>(g) Ensure adequate, predictable and sustainable financing for African Union-led peace support operations mandated by the Security Council as recently agreed by the Security Council.</p>	<p><i>The essence of the language has been retained following the methodology outlined by the co-facilitators to “minimize ... references to existing resolutions”. With that being said, the last part of the para on implementation has not made its way through to the Rev. 1.</i></p> <p><i>Reference to subregional organizations and their peace support operations in the context of financing has been removed in Rev. 1.</i></p>
<p>71. We acknowledge the important role of peace operations in advancing peacebuilding action and we reaffirm the centrality of partnership and engagement with regional and <b>subregional organizations</b>, and other partners</p>	<p>/.../ We support enhanced collaboration between the United Nations and the African Union in this regard /.../</p>	<p><i>“partnership and engagement with regional and subregional organizations, and other partners” seem to have been dropped in Rev. 1. The scene-setting paragraph although specifies supporting enhanced collaboration between the UN and the African Union, but not broadly “regional and</i></p>

		<i>subregional organizations, and other partners”.</i>
<p><b>Action 19. We will pursue a future free from terrorism.</b></p> <p>24. We strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and all terrorist acts. The promotion and the protection of human rights for all and the rule of law are essential to the fight against terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism. We agree to:</p>		
<b>Zero Draft</b>	<b>Rev. 1</b>	<b>Observations</b>
77. We commit to taking <b>preventive measures</b> , pursuant to international law, including international human rights law, to address all drivers and enablers of terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, in a balanced manner	(a) Adopt a balanced and comprehensive approach to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism conducive to terrorism.	<i>Instead of “preventive measures” in the zero-draft, the Rev. 1 proposes to “adopt a balanced and comprehensive approach”.</i>
85. We acknowledge that the accelerating pace of technological change necessitates ongoing assessment and holistic understanding of new and emerging developments in science and technology impacting international peace and security, including through misuse by non-State actors, including for terrorism.	(b) Address the threat posed by the use of new and emerging technologies, including digital technologies for terrorist purposes.	<i>The Rev. 1 is has put forward a relatively more action-oriented language, where it says, “address the threat” instead of just “acknowledging”. In addition, the scope has been further narrowed down “for <b>terrorist</b> purposes” in Rev. 1 compared to “misuse by <b>non-State actors</b>” in the zero-draft which is broader.</i>
	<b>(c) Revitalize efforts towards the conclusion of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism.</b>	<p><i>This element is a significant addition to the Rev. 1 and was proposed by Brazil, Indonesia, Ecuador, Ukraine, among other MS.</i></p> <p><i>The First and Second Reading also saw proposals from Brazil, UAE, Guatemala and Indonesia to advance discussions on an internationally agreed-upon definition of terrorism.</i></p>
<p><b>Action 20. We will combat transnational organized crime and illicit financial flows.</b></p> <p>25. Transnational organized crime poses a threat to international peace and security, human rights and sustainable development, including through the growing links between transnational organized crime and terrorist groups. We agree to:</p>		
<b>Zero Draft</b>	<b>Rev. 1</b>	<b>Observations</b>

	(a) <b>Strengthen international cooperation to prevent and combat cybercrime</b> and crimes committed through the use of information and communications technologies.	<i>Transnational organized crime has been given more attention in Rev. 1, including preventing and combatting cybercrime by strengthening international cooperation.</i>
84. We commit to strengthening the implementation of global mechanisms to combat, prevent and eradicate the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons and all its aspects. <b>We commit to strengthening, developing, and implementing regional, subregional and national targets, instruments and road maps to address challenges related to the diversion, proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons and ammunition, including in transnational organized crime.</b>	(b) Take concrete steps to detect, investigate, and prosecute illicit arms and <b>ammunition</b> and related financial flows.	<i>While the language has been shortened significantly, we can only guess whether “take concrete steps” would include “strengthening, developing, and implementing regional, subregional and national targets, instruments and road maps”.</i>  <i>The word “ammunition” has been added in the Rev. 1.</i>
<b>Action 21. We will accelerate progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons.</b>		
26. We reaffirm that nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to humanity and that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought. The only guarantee against the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. We reiterate our deep concern over the slow pace of nuclear disarmament. We agree to:		
<b>Zero Draft</b>	<b>Rev. 1</b>	<b>Observations</b>
79. We recommit to the pursuit of a world free of nuclear weapons. We will work collectively to reverse the erosion of international norms against the spread, testing and use of nuclear weapons, and <b>the instruments that support these norms</b>	(b) Reverse the erosion of international norms against the <b>possession</b> , spread, testing and use of nuclear weapons	<i>While the Rev. 1 has added the “possession ... of nuclear weapons” to the language, it has removed “the instruments that support these norms” on nuclear weapons.</i>
80. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, we call upon the nuclear weapon States to take steps to prevent any use of nuclear weapons, including through mistake or miscalculation, <b>to develop transparency and confidence-building measures</b> , to accelerate the implementation of existing nuclear disarmament commitments, and <b>to reduce the</b>	(a) Continue to call upon the nuclear-weapon States to prevent any use or <b>threat of use</b> of nuclear weapons, pending their total elimination  (c) Accelerate the implementation of existing nuclear disarmament <b>obligations</b> and commitments.	<i>The “threat of use of nuclear weapons” has been added; “transparency and confidence-building measures” has been dropped.</i>  <i>Much of the language has been retained with the addition of “obligations”. Role in national security strategies has been dropped.</i>

<p><b>role of nuclear weapons in national security strategies.</b></p>		<p><i>During the First and Second Readings, several MS proposed language calling for “early commencement of negotiations on effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances to all NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States) by all the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances”, but this did not make its way to the Rev. 1.</i></p>
<p>80. We further call upon the nuclear-weapon States to engage in dialogue on strategic stability and to elaborate next steps for further reductions of nuclear arsenals.</p>	<p>(d) Call upon the nuclear-weapon States to engage in and <b>intensify</b> dialogue on strategic stability to promote international peace and security, and to elaborate next steps <b>for nuclear disarmament</b>, including further reductions of nuclear arsenals.</p>	<p><i>The language has been expanded calling to “intensify” dialogue and also to expand the scope of elaboration of next steps to not just further reduction of arsenals, but broadly for nuclear disarmament.</i></p>
<p><b>80. We commit to strengthen measures to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors.</b></p> <p><b>81. We reaffirm the inalienable right of all countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.</b></p>		<p><i>Part of OP80 has been dropped despite no opposition from MS in the First and Second Readings.</i></p> <p><i>The full OP81 has been dropped in the Rev. 1 potentially due to the contentious nature of the discussions in the First and Second Readings. OR alternatively because the co-facilitators wanted to “minimize reaffirmations”.</i></p>
<p><b>Action 22. We will uphold our disarmament obligations.</b></p>		
<p>27. We express our serious concern at the continuous and progressive erosion of international norms and rules and obligations in the field of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. We will respect humanitarian principles that apply to weapons, means and methods of warfare, and support progressive efforts to effectively regulate arms. We recognize the importance of restoring and enhancing the role of the United Nations’ disarmament machinery. We call for full compliance with and implementation and universalization of treaties established to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Any use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, and under any circumstances is unacceptable. We reaffirm our shared determination to exclude completely the possibility of biological agents and toxins being used as weapons. We agree to:</p>		
<p><b>Zero Draft</b></p>	<p><b>Rev. 1</b></p>	<p><b>Observations</b></p>



<p>53. We express our grave concern at the continuous and progressive erosion of international norms in the field of arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament.</p> <p>We commit to pursuing agreements on disarmament and the regulation of arms to benefit the well-being and security of humanity and reduce unnecessary suffering caused by diversion of resources to armaments.</p>	<p>We express our serious concern at the continuous and progressive erosion of international norms and rules and <b>obligations</b> in the field of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.</p> <p>We will /.../ support progressive efforts to effectively regulate arms. /.../</p>	<p><i>Much of the language has been retained with “obligations” added and “arms regulation” replaced with “arms control”.</i></p> <p><i>The language has been edited from “we commit to pursuing agreements” to “we will support progressive efforts” in the Rev. 1. This part of the zero-draft was very contentious during the First and Second Readings as evidenced by the multiple proposals for alternate language. The wording “pursuing agreements” saw 7 alternate language proposals from a variety of MS from Malaysia to Mexico.</i></p>
<p>82. We commit to revitalizing the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, including consideration of the role, timing and preparations of a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, building on previous special sessions on disarmament.</p>	<p>(a) Revitalize the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, including by recommending that the General Assembly hold a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD-IV).</p>	<p><i>Language has been retained with the edit from “consideration” to “recommending” a 4<sup>th</sup> special session of the GA on disarmament.</i></p>
	<p><b>Any use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, and under any circumstances is unacceptable. We reaffirm our shared determination to exclude completely the possibility of biological agents and toxins being used as weapons.</b></p> <p><b>(b) Pursue a world free from chemical and biological weapons and ensure that those responsible for any use of these weapons are identified and held accountable.</b></p>	<p><i>The zero-draft had no mention of chemical and biological weapons. It was proposed by EU, Switzerland, South Africa, among others, during the First and Second Readings.</i></p>
<p>90. We recognize emerging and evolving biological risks and the need to anticipate, coordinate and prepare for such risks, whether caused by natural, accidental or</p>	<p>(c) Address emerging and evolving biological risks through improving processes to anticipate, coordinate and prepare for such risks, whether caused by natural,</p>	<p><i>Language has been retained except for change from “we recognize” to “address emerging”.</i></p>

deliberate release of biological agents	accidental or deliberate release of biological agents.	
83. We commit to achieving universality of treaties banning inhumane and indiscriminate weapons.	(d) Redouble our efforts to achieving universality <b>and implementation</b> of treaties that prohibit or restrict weapons for humanitarian reasons.	<i>Language has changed from “we commit to achieving” to “redouble our efforts” with “implementation of treaties added in Rev. 1.</i>
84. We commit to strengthening the implementation of global mechanisms to combat, prevent and eradicate the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons and all its aspects. /.../	(e) Strengthen our efforts to combat, prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and their ammunition in all its aspects.	<i>Language change from “strengthening the implementation”, which is relatively more action-oriented, to “strengthen our efforts”, which is input-based language, in the Rev. 1.</i>
<p><b>Action 23. We will address the risks posed by emerging domains and technologies.</b></p>		
<p>28. We recognize that rapid technological change and the emergence of potential new domains of conflict presents risks to our collective efforts to maintain international peace and security. The Charter and international law will guide our approach to addressing these risks. We agree to:</p>		
<b>Zero Draft</b>	<b>Rev. 1</b>	<b>Observations</b>
<p>86. We commit to developing, <b>through the relevant disarmament bodies of the United Nations</b> and with the widest possible acceptance, international norms, rules and principles to address threats to space systems and, on that basis, launch negotiations on a treaty to ensure peace, security and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.</p>	<p>(a) Launch negotiations on legally-binding and <b>non-legally binding instruments</b> to ensure peace, security and the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, <b>which engage all relevant stakeholders</b>.</p>	<p><i>The zero draft sequences the development of norms, rules and principles leading up to a treaty, which we assume will be legally-binding. The Rev. 1 by mentioning legally binding and non-legally binding instruments separately creates two sets of items.</i></p> <p><i>The US, UK, Japan and the EU, in combination or separately, have opposed or requested to delete language proposals from China, LMG-2, and others that mentions just “legally binding instruments”. The UK, Switzerland and Japan have proposed “a mix of legally binding instruments and political commitments” during the First and Second Readings.</i></p> <p><i>Notable edit is the removal of “through the relevant disarmament bodies of the</i></p>

		<i>United Nations” from the zero-draft and the non-mention of a forum for such negotiation in the Rev. 1.</i>
88. Building on progress made in multilateral negotiations, we commit to concluding without delay a legally binding instrument to prohibit lethal autonomous weapons systems that function without human control or oversight, and which cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law, and to regulate all other types of autonomous weapons systems.	(b) <b>Conclude by 2026</b> a legally binding instrument to prohibit autonomous weapons systems that select targets and apply force without human control, and to regulate all other types of autonomous weapons systems to ensure their compliance with international humanitarian law.	<i>The language has largely been retained with the addition of a timeframe – “conclude by 2026”.</i>
90. We recognize emerging and evolving biological risks and the need to anticipate, coordinate and prepare for such risks, whether caused by natural, accidental or deliberate release of biological agents and commit to exploring measures to address the risks involved in biotechnology and human enhancement technologies applied to the military domain.	(c) <b>Request the Secretary-General to update Member States</b> on the current status of biotechnology, <b>nanotechnologies</b> and human enhancement technologies and their implications for international peace and security in order to support Member States' future consideration of these issues	<i>While the Rev. 1 has requested the SG to update MS on these issues, it has changed language in the action part of the para from “commit to exploring measures to address the risks” in the zero-draft to support MS “future consideration of these issues”.</i>  <i>“nanotechnologies” has been added in Rev. 1.</i>
<b>Action 24. We will address the risks posed by information communication technology and artificial intelligence.</b>		
29. We are concerned about the risks to international peace and security posed by the malicious use of information and communications technologies and artificial intelligence, including by non-state actors and for terrorist purposes. We agree to:		
<b>Zero Draft</b>	<b>Rev. 1</b>	<b>Observations</b>
87. We reiterate our commitment that all States will be guided in their use of information and communications technologies by agreed norms of responsible State behaviour.	(a) <b>Uphold international law, including the Charter, as well as implement</b> agreed norms, <b>rules and principles</b> of responsible State behavior in the use of information communications technologies.	<i>The language has evolved from “will be guided” in their use of ICTs “by agreed norms of responsible State behaviour” to “implement agreed norms, rules and principles”. International law, including the UN Charter has been added.</i>
We undertake to ensure that infrastructure needed for the	(b) Ensure that critical infrastructure supporting the	<i>The language is largely retained but with a significant but subtle</i>

<p>delivery of essential public services and for the functioning of society must never be subject to malicious information and communications technology activity, from both State and non-State actors.</p>	<p>delivery of essential public services and required for the functioning of society is never intentionally damaged or impaired by malicious information and communications technology activity, from both State and non-State actors.</p>	<p><i>change. The language changes from “must never be subject to” to “never intentionally damaged or impaired”. Does this change in language open the room for critical infrastructure to be subject to malicious ICT activity to the extent that it is not damaged or impaired?</i></p>
<p>89. We commit to strengthening oversight mechanisms for the use of data-driven technology, including artificial intelligence, to support the maintenance of international peace and security.</p>	<p>(c) <b>Request the Secretary-General to present options for Member State consideration for a potential multilateral accountability mechanism to support adherence to agreed norms, rules and principles of responsible State behaviour.</b></p> <p>(d) Strengthen <b>transparency, accountability</b> and oversight mechanisms for the use, <b>development and deployment</b> of data-driven technology, including artificial intelligence, to support the maintenance of international peace and security and to ensure that the use of these technologies <b>complies with international law.</b></p>	<p><i>Added in the Rev. 1.</i></p> <p><i>The language has been expanded in Rev. 1 with the addition of “transparency, accountability”; “development and deployment”; and compliance with international law.</i></p>
<p>89. We also commit to developing norms, rules and principles on the design, development and use of military applications of artificial intelligence through a multilateral process, while also ensuring engagement with stakeholders from industry, academia, civil society and other sectors.</p>	<p>(e) Establish robust mechanisms, such as norms, rules and principles throughout the life-cycle of military applications of artificial intelligence, including in consultation with relevant stakeholders.</p>	<p><i>Language is largely retained with a change from “we also commit to developing” to “establish robust ...”, which is relatively more action-oriented language for military applications of artificial intelligence.</i></p>