

## Informal Consultations with Member States on the Policy Brief on the Emergency Platform (16 March 2023)

**ABOUT** – Following the publication of the policy Brief on the Emergency Platform by the SG, the SOTF co-facilitators – Germany and Namibia – organized consultations with stakeholders and MS on 16 March 2023 in the morning and afternoon, respectively. The consultations are one among the many planned by the SOTF co-facilitators in the lead-up to the SOTF Ministerial in September 2023 and the SOTF in 2024.

### FREQUENTLY MENTIONED POINTS

During the consultation, there was broad recognition that the global response mechanism to multi-sectoral global shocks, like COVID-19, is inadequate and that it needs to be swift, more coherent and coordinated. The Emergency Platform, as proposed by the SG in his policy brief, was thus received on a positive note. There was consensus among many MS that the Emergency Platform should not duplicate the work or functions of existing UN agencies, mechanisms and coordination bodies with some MS raising the risk of duplication/need for complementarity with the functions of ECOSOC, IASC and the GA. While mobilizing the UN system through the Emergency Platform was not opposed, MS were particular about not infringing on the mandates of individual agencies and that individual agencies remain accountable to their respective governing bodies. Over the course of the discussion, there were many requests for clarity and additional information on the proposal from the SG, which was pointed out by the representative of Brazil as – “the vagueness in many parts of the document (Policy Brief) and the many doubts raised here even in a preliminary view of the document, our first reaction is one of caution.”

### HIGHLIGHTS

Key Areas Discussed	Views of MS
<i>Terminologies used in the Policy Brief and definition of a “global shock”</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Pakistan</b> – With regard to some of the language that is being used here and we need to underline that this language is a) not endorsed so far and b) not clear at all. This response (<i>reference</i>) to multi-stakeholder participation, we are not very clear what this means.</li> <li>• <b>Panama</b> – We believe that it would be helpful to develop a glossary of definitions of relevant concepts and terms used in that document to be operative definitions for the design and implementation of that platform.</li> <li>• <b>Morocco</b> – In the policy brief, global shocks are defined as events with severely disruptive consequences for a big proportion or significant proportion of the world population, so it is very clear what this platform is meant to do.</li> <li>• <b>India</b> – The definition of global shocks needs more clarity and understanding.</li> <li>• <b>USG Guy Rider</b> – Question of requiring a better definition of what could constitute a complex global shock of the nature that would be responded to through an emergency platform – there is inherent difficulty in that type of definition, because it is, I think, axiomatic that future shocks are not knowable; their precise character will be difficult, if impossible to predict, but we do have to work on a set of criteria and thresholds that we would be able to reduce, to try to give a better response to this definitional issue. These matters can of course be addressed in the process of formulating the terms of the standing authority that might be attributed by the GA to the SG.</li> </ul>
<i>Relationship with the GA</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Pakistan</b> – The standing authority to the SG to convene such an Emergency Platform in response to complex emergencies is a good thing. We understand that this would be intergovernmentally approved, moved or intergovernmentally endorsed on a case-by-case basis and that's of course as it should be, since MS should make the final decisions.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Australia</b> – The SG provides regular reporting to the GA on its activities. We would suggest that in addition to this, at the close of each Emergency Platform, the SG should brief the GA on the efficacy and efficiency of the Emergency Platform.</li> <li>• <b>Sri Lanka</b> – It is a well-established principle that unbridled or carte blanche exercise of discretion in the best of hands is anathema to the rule of law, so we need to be careful – we are not saying that we shouldn't do it, but we need to be ultra cautious in doing so. If that kind of unbridled discretion is to be vested in any person, it must be, and I say it, has to be confined to certain checks and balances of the strictest kind.</li> <li>• <b>United States</b> – We very much like the idea of reporting to the GA and the idea of a review after the use of the Emergency Platform and think this would be particularly important after the first time such a platform was stood up to get a sense of whether or not the very idea of the concept is living up to its expectations and how it might need to be refined.</li> <li>• <b>USG Guy Rider</b> – It would seem to be a good practice to ensure that if and when a platform is activated, it would be subject to regular or appropriate reporting by the Secretariat to MS at appropriate intervals and most particularly at that point where the platform will be deactivated.</li> </ul>
<p><i>Stakeholders/members who can be considered for membership</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Panama</b> – Would it only be relevant national authorities? Would it only be those of the state or the states that are directly affected? and we're wondering whether that's the right course of action.</li> <li>• <b>China</b> – The operation of Emergency Platform cannot be disassociated from the intergovernmental and international nature of the organization. We welcome multi-stakeholders contributions and inputs in terms of crisis response, but on issues pertaining to the participation modalities and accountability among others, full deliberation by MS are required each time the platform is activated or convened.</li> <li>• <b>South Africa</b> – If created, the Emergency Platform should allow equal participation by all MS and not collusions of wielding MS. The role of the SG and that of MS should be well-defined.</li> <li>• <b>Georgia</b> – Emphasize that the platform should galvanize all relevant stakeholders that have the potential to contribute to the effective emergency responses this will help us to tackle multi-dimensional threats with a multi-dimensional response.</li> <li>• <b>USG Guy Rider</b> – The SG has reiterated of course that you as MS are they decision-makers in these matters, but that there is benefit and there is added value to appropriate multi-stakeholders to be accountable to and be involved, as appropriate, in the work of these platforms.</li> </ul>
<p><i>Criteria for Activation</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Panama</b> – It would be necessary to have greater detail as to the procedures and particular attention should be granted to the process flow to activate that platform.</li> <li>• <b>Mexico</b> – We'd like to stress our concern on what would constitute an emergency justifying the establishment of a platform. While the brief mentions several examples of complex global crises, the dimensions of a crisis could generate inaccurate interpretations and different understandings depending on the context.</li> <li>• <b>Georgia</b> – We believe that it is important to equip the SG with the standing authority to expeditiously convene and operationalize the Emergency Platform, which will be authorized by the decision of the GA.</li> <li>• <b>Canada</b> – We will need to clearly define the thresholds for activation and deactivation.</li> <li>• <b>United Kingdom</b> – It would be good to better understand the threshold for activating the Emergency Platform. In our view, the Emergency Platform should be reserved for exceptionally rare and short-term, not chronic circumstances. When that established threshold has been breached and when existing mechanisms and mandates do not have the capacity to respond.</li> </ul>

<p><i>Closure of the Emergency Platform</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b><a href="#">Sri Lanka</a></b> – Once activated, there is also perhaps no sunset clause.</li> <li>• <b>Japan</b> – We hope to qualify on several points including the mechanism of review after each platform to ensure its effectiveness, efficiency and transparency so that the platform could be improved.</li> <li>• <b>USG Guy Rider</b> – The fact that the platform would not be a standing body, but rather a mechanism convened, also means that there should be sunset clauses attached to it. It would be of a determined length of time based on need and therefore a period of deactivation would be part of the overall process.</li> </ul>
<p><i>Accountability</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Russian Federation</b> – It's unclear where accountability comes into this – who will they be accountable to.</li> <li>• <b><a href="#">Australia</a></b> supports the idea of accountability mechanisms that encourage collaboration and joined up efforts. We see value in greater detail on how the Emergency Platform can ensure this buy-in and accountability to achieve cross-sectoral collective response when it is needed.</li> </ul>
<p><i>Funding for the Emergency Platform</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>United Kingdom</b> – Neither the mobilizing of, nor the support of the platform, should require regular budgets.</li> <li>• <b>Indonesia</b> – Resource mobilization also becomes our shared significant challenge especially to assist developing countries. To this extent, intensifying dialogue with the Bretton Woods institutions is critical to ensure resilience as well as to form stronger and well-coordinated actions.</li> </ul>

## RESOURCES

1. [Emergency Platform Policy Brief](#)

## Statements

2. [UNDRR](#)
3. [Cuba on behalf of G77 and China](#)

4. [Australia](#)
5. [Canada](#)
6. [China](#)
7. [Mexico](#)
8. [Norway](#)
9. [Panama](#)
10. [South Africa](#)
11. [Sri Lanka](#)
12. [Vietnam](#)